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PRELIMINARY MATTERS

STANDARD OP REVIEW
Review of Agency Determinations of Fact*
Petitioner
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from this Court unless he has been substantially prejudiced by an
agenc \ r acti oi I "based upon a determination of fact , made or
implied by the agency, that i s not supported b;y su&stanti al
1

evidence when viewed in light of the whole record before the
court."

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(g) (Supp. 1990).

"Substantial evidence" is such "relevant evidence as a reasonable
mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion."

Grace

Drilling Company v. Board of Review of the Industrial Commission
of Utah, 776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989).
review nor a complete evidentiary review.
the agency record as a whole. Id.

This is not de novo
Id.

It is a review of

The Court must review the

Board's findings by examining both the supporting evidence and
that which fairly detracts from those findings.

2.

Review of Agency Determinations of Legal Issues,

Bennion is not entitled to relief unless he can demonstrate
that he has been substantially prejudiced by an erroneous
interpretation of the law.
(Supp. 1990).

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-16(4)(d)

While the determination of applicable law is

subject to the "correction of error" standard, in this case the
resolution of the legal issues are benefitted by the Board's
expertise, and hence are entitled to deference to the Board's
resolution.

Olympus Oil Inc. v. Harrison, 778 P.2d 1008 (Utah

Ct. App. 1989) .
The issues presented in this case involve questions of
statutory interpretation in a highly specialized area of oil and
gas law.

Because the Board is statutorily chosen and retained

for its expertise in these matters, deference should be granted
in the first instance to the Board's interpretation of statute
2

concerning oil exploration and production.

Gump & Ayers Real

Estate. Inc. v. Domcoy Investors V, 733 P.2d 128 (Utah 1987).

3*

Review of Agency Application of Lav to Facts.

Bennion is not entitled to relief unless he can demonstrate
that he has been substantially prejudiced by an unreasonable or
irrational application of the law.
16(4)(d) (Supp. 1990),

Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-

Review of the Board's application of law

to facts and mixed questions of law and fact governed by the
"reasonableness and rationality" standard requiring that the
Boardfs decision not exceed "the bounds of reasonableness and
rationality."

Pearl-Benefit Staffing v. Board of Review of the

Industrial Commission of Utah. 775 P.2d 439 (Utah App. 1989);
Johnson v. Department of Employment Security. 782 P.2d 965 (Utah
App. 1989).

B.

CITATION TO THE RECORD
This brief contains numerous references to the Record on

Appeal, the Hearing Transcripts and Exhibits entered during the
adjudicative proceedings.

Citations to the Record on Appeal will

be by the abbreviation "R." followed by the page of the Record on
which the matter can be found.

Citations to portions of the

September 27, 1990 Board Hearing Transcripts will be by the
abbreviation "Tr." followed by the particular page of the
transcript on which that fact can be found.

Exhibits received

during the Board Hearing will be cited by the abbreviation "Ex."
3

The addendum contains the order upon which review is sought
as well as exhibits, statutes and administrative rules.
Citations to materials in the Addendum shall be by reference to
the Transcript, Record on Appeal or the Exhibit, followed by the
abbreviation "Add*" for Addendum and the page of the Addendum
where that siuthority, fact or document may be found.

V.

DETERMINATIVE LAW

The statutes determinative of this matter are Utah Code Ann.
S 40-6-1 (1990), § 40-6-6 (1990) and § 40-6-9 (Supp. 1990).

Utah

Admin. R. 619-105-100, 200 and 500, R. 619-108-100, 200, and 201,
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) and 56 and Utah Rules of
Evidence 402 and 403 are also relevant.

These rules and statutes

are reprinted in the Addendum to this Brief.

VI.
A.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

NATURE OP THE CASE
This is a petition for a writ of review of an order of the

Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, (the "Board") granting a
Motion to Dismiss and for Summary Judgment.

By petition pursuant

to Utah Cod€i Ann. § 40-6-9 (Supp. 1990) , Sam H. Bennion
("Bennnion") sought an order from the Board requiring the
Respondent, Graham Resources, Inc. ("Graham") to account for and
to pay Bennion all proceeds due Bennion from the Jensen-Fenzl No.
1 Well, 1-20C5, Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West and
the Page 2-20C5 Well, Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West,
4

Duchesne County, State of Utah (the "Wells").

(R. at 1-6). The

two parties attempted to negotiate a resolution prior to
appearing before the Board.
unsuccessful.

However, the negotiations were

Graham, relying on the absence of an agreement or

Order pooling Bennion's interest, moved for Dismissal of
Bennion's Petition or for Summary Judgment.

(R. at 82-99).

central issue before the Board was one of first impression.

The
That

is, whether pooling of a nonconsenting ownerfs interest pursuant
to Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6 is a statutory condition precedent to
entitlement to payment and accounting pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 40-6-9.
Subsidiary issues raised on appeal involve the authority of
the Board to hear and grant a Motion for Summary Judgment
pursuant to Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure and to
exclude evidence as irrelevant or untimely.

B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS BELOW
On July 17 1990, Bennion filed a petition with the Board

pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9 (Supp. 1990) (R. at 1-6).
This followed previous actions concerning the same requested
relief in Federal Courts and before the Board.

Bennion's

previous Petition for an accounting (Cause No. 139-47) was
dismissed by the Board at their June 28,1990 hearing for lack of
timely prosecution.

(R. at 33-36; Add. E) .

Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9(5), the Board asked the
parties to attempt to negotiate a resolution to the July 17, 1990
5

Petition.

These negotiations occurred August 16, 1990.

(R. at

31, 115). The parties attempted to reach an agreement by August
31, 1990, but were unsuccessful.

Following the negotiations,

Bennion filed a Pre-Hearing Issue Statement on September 6, 1990.
(R. at 28-32).

On September 10, 1990, Graham filed a Motion for

Dismissal, or in the alternative, for Summary Judgment.
101-103).

(R. at

With this motion, Graham also filed a Memorandum and

exhibits in support of the Motion.

(R. at 82-99).

Bennion did not file any pleadings in opposition to Graham's
Motion for Dismissal and Summary Judgment.

On September 17,

1990, Bennion's counsel sent a letter objecting to the philosophy
of Graham's motion and asked the Board to set forth the issues
that the Board would hear at the September 27, 1990 Board
Hearing.

(R. at 117-119).

On September 17, 1990, Graham filed a

Pre-Hearing Issue Statement. (R. 104-115)
On September 25, 1990, Bennion's counsel moved for a
Continuance, claiming that Mr. Bennion would not be able to
attend the Board Hearing.

(R. at 128-130).

Graham filed an

Objection to Bennion's Motion for Continuance the same day.

(R.

at 124-127).
At the September 27, 1991 Board Hearing, the Board granted
Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment and denied Bennion's request
for continuance. (Tr. at 72, 73).
On October 15, 1990, Bennion sent a letter to the Board
claiming the Board had improperly excluded his exhibits from the
record, and requesting that the Board admit Bennion's exhibits
6

into the record.

On October 26, 1990, Graham filed an Objection

and Motion to Strike Bennion's post-hearing submission of
exhibits. (R. at 146-156).

The Board ordered a Hearing on

December 6, 1990 to dispose of Graham's Objection and Motion to
Strike.

(R. at 158-159).

On December 3, 1990, Bennion filed a

response to Graham's Objection and Motion to Strike.
177).

(R. at 169-

On January 24, 1990, the Board issued its Findings of

Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order.

(R. at 185-192; Add. A ) .

The Board concluded that pooling was a prerequisite to an
accounting and payment of proceeds.

Additionally, the Board

issued a Supplementary Order dealing with the post-hearing
Motions and Objections in which the Board ordered that Bennion's
exhibits be admitted to the record on appeal.

(R. at 193-197;

Add. B ) .

VII.

SUMMARY OF RELEVANT FACTS

On July 17, 1990, Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9 (Supp.
1990), Bennion filed a Petition for Agency Action with the Board.
(R. at 1-6) . Bennion sought an Order from the Board forcing
Graham to provide Petitioner with an accounting of proceeds and
for payment of production from the Wells.

(R. at 1-6). Graham

has been the operator of the Wells since April, 1984.

(R. at

12) .
Bennion first brought this issue before the Federal
District Court in Idaho.

The court dismissed the case because it

lacked personal jurisdiction.

(R. at 48-56; Add. C ) .
7

Bennion then brought the issue before the Federal District
Court in Utah.

However, the court dismissed Bennion's case

because it determined that an administrative remedy should be
sought.

(R. 40-47; Add. D ) .

Thereafter, Bennion filed a Petition with the Board, which
was heard on June 28, 1990 as Cause No. 139-47.

The Board

dismissed the Petition without prejudice for failure to timely
prosecute.

(R. at 34; Add. E ) .

At the time of dismissal, the Board indicated to the parties
that the requested relief could not be ordered in the absence of
pooling.

The Board advised the parties to resolve the pooling

issue between themselves, or to initiate a forced pooling.

(R.

at 34; Add. E ) .
On July 17, 1990, Bennion again petitioned the Board for an
accounting from Graham.

(R. at 1-6). Pursuant to Utah Code Ann.

§ 40-6-9(5), the Board ordered that the parties meet to negotiate
and investigate the matter on August 16, 1990 at the Division of
Oil, Gas and Mining to exchange relevant information and attempt
to resolve the issue.

(R. at 31 and R. at 115).

Both parties stated in their Pre-Hearing Issue Statements
that no voluntary or involuntary pooling order is in effect
concerning the wells.

(R. 108-116, 28-32).

Consequently, the

parties each recognized as a central issue for the Board, the
question of the necessity of a pooling, either voluntary or
involuntary, as a prerequisite for Bennion to receive relief
under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9.

(Tr. at 28)
8

(R. at 112 and R. at

30).

Bennion is a non-consenting mineral interest owner as

defined in Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) and has refused to lease or
otherwise commit his mineral interest to the wells.

(R. at 96).

On September 10, 1989, Graham filed a Motion and
Memorandum of Points and Authorities to Dismiss Bennion's Request
for Agency Action or in the alternative for Summary Judgment.
(R. at 82-99).

On September 17, Bennion, by letter, objected to

Graham's Motion to Dismiss.

(R. at 117-119).

On September 25,

two days before the Board Hearing, Bennion filed a Motion to
Continue, claiming that he had a scheduling conflict and was
unclear concerning the issues to be adjudicated on September
27th.

(R. at 128-130).

Continuance.

The Board denied Bennion's Motion for

( R. at 185) (Tr. at 13).

At the September 27, 1990 Hearing, the Board heard Graham's
Motion for Dismissal or Summary Judgment in which Graham asserted
that Bennion was not entitled to proceeds from the wells until a
voluntary or involuntary pooling order was in effect concerning
the wells.

(R. at 185-192) (Tr. at 3, 46-47).

Bennion's counsel proffered several exhibits to the Board as
evidence.

(Tr. at 6, 8, 11, 12, 16, 23, 26, 44-46, 64;

Plaintiff's Exhibits 1-21).

The Board, pursuant to Utah Admin.

R. 619-108-200, ruled that the exhibits were irrelevant to
Graham's Motion.

Additionally, the Board ruled that the exhibits

were not filed in a timely manner pursuant to Utah Admin. R. 619105-100, 200 and 500. None of Petitioner's exhibits were
admitted into evidence.

However, they were accepted as proffers
9

and made part of the record in a Supplemental Order.

(Tr. at 28-

29) (R. at 193-197).

VIII.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The Board was within its express authority to grant Graham's
Motion to Dismiss Bennion's Petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
§ 63-46b-l(4)(6) (1990).

The Board judgment was made pursuant to

Rule 12(b)(6) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure which provides
that where, on a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim
upon which relief can be granted, matters outside the pleadings
are presented and not excluded by the forum, the Motion is to be
treated as a Motion for Summary Judgment under Rule 56, Utah R.
Civ. P.

The Board is further authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 4 0 -

6-1 et seq. to make orders that will reduce waste and protect the
correlative rights of all owners.
The Board properly dismissed Bennion's action
Summary Judgment to Graham.

and awarded

There are two methods to determine a

fair and reasonable allocation of production and expenses from
oil and gas wells.

Bennion seeks relief under a variation of the

doctrine of Equitable Pooling which is based on the original
Spacing Order and results in a court deciding the share of
proceeds for each mineral rights owner.

However, pursuant to

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 et seq. (Supp. 1990) the preferred method
adopted by the Utah legislature is based upon an intermediary
step after spacing.

That is, pooling of the mineral interests in

the drilling unit.

The Board following the statute, held that to
10

determine production there must be a voluntary or involuntary
pooling agreement.
The parties Pre-Hearing Statements of Issues and Facts
stipulated to the absence of a pooling.

Both parties and the

Board relied on this fact and agreed that the absence of pooling
was an issue to be resolved prior to an order ordering an
accounting.
Bennion is not prejudiced by the Board's entry of Summary
Judgment because he may at any time seek a forced pooling of his
interest to determine Bennion!s fair and reasonable share of
production, costs and nonconsent penalty.
Pursuant to Utah Admin. R. 619-105-100, 200 and 500 and R.
619-108-200 et seg., the Board has broad discretion to reject
exhibits or evidence that are presented because the exhibits are
irrelevant to the disputed issue, or not properly nor timely
filed.

The Board properly ruled against the admission of

Bennion's proffered exhibits as evidence because they were not
offered in opposition to the issue of the necessity of pooling
then before the Board and were thus irrelevant.
IX.
A.

ARGUMENT

THE BOARD PROPERLY ENTERED SUMMARY JUDGMENT IN FAVOR OF
GRAHAM

1.
The Board is Expressly Authorized by the Utah
Administrative Procedures Act to Grant a Motion for Summary
Judgment on the Pleadings if the Requirements of Rule 56 of the
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure are Met.
The Utah Administrative Procedures Act authorizes
administrative agencies to dismiss actions under the
11

circumstances identified in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure.

The relevant section of the act states:

This chapter does not preclude an Agency, prior to the
beginning of an adjudicative proceeding, or the presiding
officer during an adjudicative proceeding from . . .
granting a timely motion for Summary Judgment . . . if the
requirements of Rule 56 . . . of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure are met by the moving party, except to the extent
that the requirements of those rules are modified by this
chapter.
Utah Code Ann. § 63-46b-l(4)(b) (1990).
Chapter 46b of the Act does not modify Rule 56 Motions for
Summary Judgments.

Neither the implementing statute of the Oil

and Gas Act, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1

et seq. (Supp. 1990) nor

the Administrative Rules of the Board, Utah Admin. R. 619 et seq.
modify this authority of the Board.
The Pre-Hearing Issue and Fact Statements of the parties
stipulate and agree that there has been no pooling, either
voluntary or forced, of Bennion's interest in the wells. Both
parties in their pleadings agree that the requirement of pooling
prior to an accounting and order of payment under Utah Code Ann.
§ 40-6-9 is an issue to be determined by the Board.

Neither

party presented evidence to contradict the factual assertion that
Bennion's mineral interests were not pooled with regard to the
two wells for which he sought accounting and payment.
Furthermore, no authority was provided in opposition to the
Motion for Summary Judgment.

Accordingly, the matter was ripe

for Summary Judgment.
2.
Bennion is Not Entitled Under Utah Code Ann. S 40-6-9
(1990) to an Accounting and Payment of Proceeds Until His
Interests Have Been Pooled Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. S 40-6-6.
12

In this case, Bennion seeks relief from the Board such that
his rights to proceeds from two wells drilled by the designated
operator on a designated state drilling unit may be accounted for
and paid to him without his interests having been pooled with the
other ownerfs interests with which he wishes to share.

Bennion

sought this relief under both Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-9 and 40-66(8)(k)•

Bennion further requests an accounting showing costs

incurred, together with quantity of oil or gas produced and the
amount of proceeds realized from the sale of production.
The rights and duties of mineral interest owners in the
state of Utah are governed by the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation
Act.

Preliminarily, the statute provides for the establishment

of drilling units for production of oil and gas.

A mineral

interest owner's participation in a well or wells drilled in a
drilling unit and the correlative rights to accounting and
payment of proceeds comes directly from voluntary pooling or
forced pooling of his oil and gas interests in the drilling unit.
See Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5) (Supp. 1990).

Mineral interest

owners may voluntarily pool their interests in the lands and
leases contained within a drilling unit by entering into written
agreements to combine or pool those interests and to jointly
develop them in an agreed upon fashion.

The rights and duties of

the operator of the well, vis-a-vis the other mineral interest
owners, are defined by such agreements.

These agreements specify

the terms upon which owners may receive an accounting.

13

As to those mineral interest owners who refuse to
voluntarily commit or pool their mineral interests in the
drilling unit, Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(5) (Supp. 1990), provides
a statutory procedure for the forced pooling of nonconsenting
interests.

In such cases the rights and duties of the operator

in relationship to the other force pooled interests are defined
by statute. Where, as here, Bennion has refused to lease or
otherwise voluntarily join, the Utah forced pooling statute is
determinative of the outcome of this case.

See Bennion v. Utah

State Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah
1983) (hereinafter "Bennion I").
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(8) (Supp. 1990) provides the
accounting provisions of the forced pooling statute to be applied
by the Board.

This statute provides in pertinent part:

The operator of a well under a pooling order in which
there are nonconsenting owners shall furnish the nonconsenting owners with monthly statements of all costs
incurred, together with the quantity of oil or gas
produced, and the amount of proceeds realized from the
sale of this production during the preceding months.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(8) (Supp. 1990) (emphasis added).
A "nonconsenting owner" is one who owns oil and gas interests in
a drilling unit established by the Board but has refused to lease
or otherwise join in the drilling of the well on the drilling
unit and who refuses to assume the risk of drilling by paying his
prorata share of the costs of drilling the well.

See Utah Code

Ann. § 40-6-6(6) (Supp. 1990).
There are statutory conditions precedent for a nonconsenting
owner to meet prior to receiving statutory relief in the form of
14

an accounting ordered by the Board.

These conditions are (1) the

formal spacing of the acreage into drilling units and (2) the
forced pooling of the nonconsenting interest into the established
drilling unit.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-6(5), -6(8) (Supp. 1990).

Where, as here, the Board is construing the statute which it is
administering, that constructure is entitled to considerable
weight.

Utah Department of Administrative Services v. Public

Service Commission, 658 P.2d 601, 610 (Utah 1983)
The crux of Bennionfs petition pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §
40-6-9 and the Board's entry of Summary Judgment revolves around
the issue of when a party becomes "entitled" to proceeds under
that section of the statute.

The two sources for determining

what and when Bennion is entitled to the relief provided by Utah
Code Ann. § 40-6-9 are the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act and
this Court's decision in Bennion I.
Graham did not maintain, and the Board did not hold, that
Bennion was not vested with the statutory royalty retroactive to
the date of the spacing order, nor that his mineral interests
would not represent an aliquot share of production in kind or in
money value when his interests statutorily matured.

This Court,

in Bennion I. focused on when, in the history of the drilling
unit, did Bennion have a right to participate in production from
a well.

Bennion I determined, "[T]he . . . right of the owner of

a mineral interest who refuses to enter into a voluntary pooling
agreement with the operator of a drilling unit as to the period
prior to the effective date of an order forcing the pooling of
15

all interests in the drilling unit,"
added)•

Bennion I at 1137 (emphasis

This Court was not faced with the issue of whether

forced pooling is a prerequisite to an accounting in that case
because there already existed a forced pooling order.

This Court

in Bennion I held:
We therefore affirm the Board's position that Bennion,
as a non-consenting mineral interest owner, had a
vested right to royalty prior to payout and a vested
right to a statutory share (subject to payment of
expenses) thereafter.
Id. at 1142 (emphasis added).
Therefore, Bennion is entitled to payment of proceeds only after
he pays the statutory expenses that this Court recognized in
Bennion I . Both this Court's holding and the forced pooling
provision of Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6-(6) (1980) reinforce the
conclusion that under Utah law, pooling is a prerequisite to an
accounting under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9.

There must be either a

voluntary agreement or statutory pooling Order in effect for an
Order of accounting of proceeds to be entered.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6(6) states:
each nonconsentina owner shall be entitled to receive,
subject to royalty or similar obligations, the share of
production from the well applicable to his interest in
the unit after the consenting owners have recovered
from the nonconsentina owners share of production the
following:
(a) in respect to every such well 100% of the nonconsenting owner's share of the cost of surface
equipment . . . plus 100% of the nonconsentina owner's
share of the cost of operation of the well commencing
with first production and continuing until the
consenting owners have recovered those costs . . . and
(b) an amount to be determined by the Board but not
less than 150% nor to exceed 200% of that portion of
the costs and expenses of staking the location, wellsite preparation, rights-of-way, rigging up, drilling,
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reworking, deepening or plugging back, testing, and
completing, and the cost of the equipment in the well .
. . . A reasonable interest charge may be included if
the Board finds it appropriate.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-6-(6)(a)(b) (Supp. 1990). (emphasis added).
Bennion argues that the Board can determine what payments
are to be made and the subsequent accounting to a nonconsenting
owner under an informal "equitable" pooling. (Tr. at 55-57).
"Equitable" pooling is neither compulsory, nor voluntary, but
exists in the absence of compulsory pooling provisions in
statute.
(1985).

See 6 H. Williams and C. Meyers, Oil and Gas Law, § 906
This treatise suggests the term "judicial" replace the

term "equitable" because in the cases "equitable pooling is
implemented, "the Court orders pooling that is probably not
contemplated by the parties nor by the legislature that passed
the conservation statute."

6 H. Williams and C. Meyers, Oil and

Gas Law, § 906.1 (1985).
Bennion's argument before the Board and this Court is that
he is entitled to an equitable remedy based upon his
representation that he has at all times been entitled to
production from the drilling unit in which he owns a mineral
interest.
statute.

His argument is one of equity and divorced from the
Moreover, Bennion has never explained either to the

Board or in his Brief to this Court, why he is entitled to an
equitable remedy separate and apart from the remedy provided by
statute.

His concept of "entitlement" is entitlement in a broad

equitable sense, and not entitlement as set forth specifically by
this Court in Bennion I and in the Oil and Gas Conservation Act.
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In reality, Bennion's appeal is simply another avenue by
which he seeks to avoid contributing to the costs and sharing in
the risk of drilling wells in drilling units in which he owns a
mineral interest.

He seeks to raise his correlative right to a

right greater than the right of all other interest owners in the
drilling unit and by so doing seeks to undermine the statutory
scheme which the legislature established to protect the
correlative rights of all mineral interest owners and to insure
that waste is eliminated through the encouragement of the
drilling of oil and gas upon the lands of the state of Utah.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-1 (Supp. 1990).

See

By invoking the statutory

remedy before the Board provided by Utah Code Ann. § 4 0-6-9,
Bennion must comply with the complete statutory scheme and
subject his interest to the pooling process.
In conclusion, pursuant to Utah statutory requirement, the
Board cannot order, nor can Graham provide, an accounting until
Bennionfs current ownership is established and his interest is
force pooled so as to establish the criteria by which his quantum
of interest in proceeds is determined.
B.
THE BOARD PROPERLY REFUSED TO ADMIT BENNION'S EVIDENCE
PROFFERED ON BEHALF OF HIS CASE IN CHIEF.
The Board properly exercised its discretion under its
procedural rules in excluding Bennion's (Petitioner's) exhibits
1-21.

Pursuant to Utah Admin. R. 619-105-500, "the Board may

consider any exhibits filed after the due date, if the exhibits
are accompanied by a separate motion for good cause."
Additionally, pursuant to Utah Admin. R. 619-108-201, the Board
18

{may} "exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial or unduly
repetitious."
Bennionfs exhibits were not timely filed.

Pursuant to Utah

Admin. R. 619-105-100, the Petitioner must file its request for
Agency Action on the tenth day of the month preceding the
hearing.

Utah Admin. R. 619-105-100 further requires that at the

time a petitioner requests agency action, the petitioner must
"also file any motions, affidavits, briefs, or memoranda intended
to be offered by said petitioner in support of said petitioner
motion."

Utah Admin. R. 619-105-100.

The hearing in this matter

was September 27, 1990, therefore Bennion should have filed his
supporting documents and exhibits by August 10, 1990.

If Bennion

sought to enter the exhibits and affidavits in response to
Graham's Motion to Dismiss or in the alternative for Summary
Judgment, the exhibits were still not timely filed.

Not only did

Bennion fail to file a Response Memorandum, but pursuant to Utah
Admin. R. 619-105-500 the following procedural rules apply:
Any exhibits intended to be offered by petitioners . .
. in support of matters set forth in their . . .
pleadings will be filed with the Secretary of the Board
on or before the time the response is due under R619105-200 . . . any exhibits filed by any party after the
close of business two days prior to the hearing, but
before the hearing, may be considered by the Board at
the hearing only upon separate motion of the party
offering the exhibit made at the hearing for good cause
shown. Any exhibits intended to be offered by the
parties in rebuttal of evidence presented at the
hearing will be presented at the hearing.
Utah Admin. R. 619-105-500 (Supp. 1991).
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Bennion did not comply with this rule, nor did he move the Court
for deviation from the rule or set forth any basis for relief
from the rule.
Finally, Petitioner's exhibits 1-21 were not presented in
rebuttal to evidence presented for the first time at the Hearing.
Indeed, the only evidence Graham presented at the Hearing was
that evidence contained in its memorandum in support of its
motion.

Graham timely filed this memorandum, pursuant to Utah

Admin. R. 619-105-200: "motions by respondent, together with all
affidavits, briefs, or memoranda in support thereof, filed by the
tenth day of the month . . . in which the hearing on the matter
is scheduled . . . may be considered by the Board at its
regularly scheduled meeting during the month."
The Board, pursuant to Utah Admin. R. 619-108-100, shall
"regulate the course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of
relevant fcicts and to afford all the parties reasonable
opportunity to present their positions."

In this case, Mr.

Bennion had full opportunity both by proffer and by the exhibits
contained in Graham's memorandum to argue his position.
The Board properly excluded Petitioner's exhibits not only
because they were untimely, but also because they were
irrelevant, immaterial, and unduly repetitious.
619-108-201 (Supp. 1991).

Utah Admin. R.

In the first instance, Bennion

proffered the exhibits as evidence for his case in chief.
at 6, 8, 11, 12, 16, 23 and 26).

(Tr.

Secondly, Bennion submitted his

evidence while acknowledging that there was no forced pooling in
20

effect.

Third, a review of the proffered evidence demonstrates

that it contained some of the same documents and correspondence
included in Graham1s memorandum.

The Utah Rules of Evidence

define relevant evidence, as "evidence having any tendency to
make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the
determination more • . . or less probable than it would be
without the evidence."

Rule 402, Utah Rules of Evidence.

The

fact of consequence in the Board's hearing concerned whether or
not Bennion had met all statutory requirements that would
"entitle" him to an accounting by Board Order pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. § 40-6-9 (Supp. 1990).

(Tr. at 28 and 29).

Because the parties have stipulated in their separate prehearing statements that there was no pooling, the exhibits
proffered by Mr. Stirba cannot render Bennion!s pooling status
more or less probable because neither party asserted that Bennion
was involuntarily or voluntarily pooled at the time of the
hearing.

Thus, Bennion's exhibits were irrelevant to the issue

at hand and the exhibits were properly not admitted as evidence
consistent with Rule 403 of the Utah Rules of Evidence which
states "evidence which is not relevant is not admissible."

This

Court, in Bambrouah v. Buthers, 552 P.2d 1286 (Ut. 1976) held
that a trial court should be given considerable discretion in
deciding whether or not evidence submitted is relevant.
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining is not a trial court.

The

However,

concerning issues of relevance, the discretion of the Board in
this matter should be granted some deference because the Board is
21

chosen pursuant to its expertise in Oil and Gas areas. Utah Code
Ann. § 40-6-4(2) (Supp. 1990).

In this case, the Board construed

the technical requirements of the statute and determined that
Petitioner's exhibits 1-21 were irrelevant.

X.

CONCLUSION

The Board, exercising its express authority to enter Summary
Judgment when properly presented, determined that Bennionfs
petition was properly disposed of upon the issue of when a
nonconsenting owner was entitled to an accounting and payment of
proceeds under Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9.

The Board construed the

statute it is charged with interpreting and applied it in concert
with this Court's decision in Bennion I.
The Board's Order is entitled to "considerable weight."

The

Board properly exercised its discretion to exclude evidence
submitted by Bennion as both untimely and as irrelevant.
Therefore, the Board's Orders of January 24, 1991, and its
Supplemental Order of January 24, 1991 should be upheld.
DATED this

day of August, 1991.
Respectfully"submitted,
Paul Van Dam z'
)
f)
Utah Attorney General //

Thomas A. Mitchell, ^Es^.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorney for Respondent
Utah Board of Oil, Gas and Mining

22

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I caused to be mailed first class, postage
prepaid, a true and correct copy of the foregoing RESPONDENT
UTAH BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING'S BRIEF on this 2nd day of
August, 1991 to:
Matthew McNulty
Van Cott, Bagley, Cornwall & McCarthy
50 South Main Street
Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
Peter Stirba
Stirba & Hathaway
215 South State Street
Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111

IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

In the Matter of

Case No. 910089

SAM H. BENNION,
Petitioner,
v.
GRAHAM RESOURCES, INC., and the
UTAH BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND
MINING,

Priority 15

Respondents.

ADDENDUM TO RESPONDENT UTAH BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING'S BRIEF

PETITION FOR WRIT OF REVIEW FROM
THE UTAH BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING

Paul Van Dam
Thomas A. Mitchell
Assistant Attorney General
#3 Triad Center, Suite 350
355 West North Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84140-1203
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
UTAH BOARD OF OIL , GAS
AND MINING
Peter Stirba
STIRBA & HATHAWAY
215 South State Street
Suite 1150
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
ATTORNEY FOR PETITIONER
SAM H. BENNION

Phillip Wm. Lear
Matthew F. McNulty
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL
& MCCARTHY
50 South Main Street
Suite 1600
Salt Lake City, Utah 84144
ATTORNEY FOR RESPONDENT
GRAHAM RESOURCES, INC.

ADDENDUM

"A"

Conclusions and Order - January 24, 1991

W

Supplemental Order - January 24, 1991

B"

"C"

Federal District Court Idaho order

"D"

Federal District Court Utah Order

"E"

Order dismissing Petition

W

Utah Code Ann § 63-46b-16 (1990)

F"

"G"

Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-1, 40-6-6, 40-6-9

"H"

3 Utah Admin. R. 619-105-100, 200, 500

"I"

3 Utah Admin. R. 619-108-100, 200, 201

"J"

3 Utah Rules of Evidence, Rule 402, 403

ADDENDUM A
STATE OF UTAH

DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
ooOoo

IN THE MATTER OF SAM H. BENNION
FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING GRAHAM
RESOURCES, INC. TO PAY ROYALTY
AND PRODUCTION PAYMENTS ON THE
JENSEN-FENZL NO. 1 WELL 1-20C5,
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH,
RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY,
UTAH, AND THE PAGE 2-20C5
WELL, SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3
SOUTH, RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE
COUNTY, UTAH

FINDINGS OF FACTS AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
AND ORDER
DOCKET NO. 90-034
CAUSE NO. 139-66

ooOoo
Pursuant to the Request for Agency Action of Sam H. Bennion
("Bennion"), this cause came before the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining,
Department of Natural Resources, on Thursday, September 27, 1990,
commencing^ at the hour of 10:35 a.m. in the boardroom of the Division
of Oil, Gas and Mining, 3 Triad Center, Suite 301, 355 West North
Temple, Salt Lake City, Utah.
At the hearing of September 27, 1990, argument of the parties was
heard. The following Board members were present at the hearing:
James W. Carter, Acting Chairman
John M. Garr
Richard B. Larsen
E. Steele Mclntyre
Kent G. Stringham
Chairman Gregory P. Williams recused himself from this
hearing.
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The Board was represented by Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq., Assistant
Attorney General for the State of Utah,
Appearances for the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining ("Division")
were made by Dr. Dianne R. Nielson, Director; Ronald J. Firth,
Associate Director, Oil and Gas; John R. Baza, Petroleum Engineer;
and Brad Hill, Petroleum Geologist.
Bennion was represented by Peter Stirba, Esq. and Barbara
Zimmerman, Esq.
Graham Resources, Inc. ("Graham") was represented by Phillip Wm.
Lear, Esq. and Danielle M. Ferron, Esq.
NOW THEREFORE, the Board, having considered the testimony
adduced, the exhibits received in evidence, and the pleadings of the
parties and being fully advised in the premises, now makes and enters
the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1. Due and regular notice of the time, place and purpose of the
September 27, 1990, hearing was given to all interested parties as
required by law and the rules and regulations of the Board.
2. The Board has jurisdiction over the subject matter, of the
Request for Agency Action and over all the parties interested therein
and has jurisdiction to make and promulgate the Order hereinafter set
forth.
3. Pursuant to Section 40-6-9, Utah Code Annotated, (1988),
Bennion has requested that the Board conduct an investigation and
negotiation and that if unsuccessful, the Board order a hearing to
determine why proceeds have not been paid to Bennion from the
Jensen-Fenzl No. 1 Well, 1-20C5, Section 20, Township 3 South, Range
5 West and the Page 2-20C5 Well, Section 20, Township 3 South, Range
5 West, Duchesne County, State of Utah ("the Wells").
-2-
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4. Bennion's Request for Agency Action, sought relief as
follows:
a.

That the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining initiate an
investigation of the facts of this matter so that
negotiations can take place as required by § 40-6-9(4)
and (5), Utah Code Ann., (1988);

b.

that should negotiations be unsuccessful, the Board
order a hearing as required by § 40-6-9(6), Utah Code
Ann., (1988) ;

c.

that the Board order Graham to make an accounting to
Bennion for all oil, gas and natural gas liquids
produced from the wells;

d.

that the Board order Graham to pay Bennion all
royalties and working interests not presently paid to
Bennion for his share of oil, gas and natural gas
liquids in the wells;

e.

that the Board find that Graham's delay of payments
from the wells were knowing and intentional and without
reasonable justification;

f.

that the Board assess a penalty to Graham of
twenty-five percent of the payments owed Bennion and
interest to the rate of 1.5% per month from the date of
delinquency until paid;

g.

that the Board order that Bennion not be required to
pay his share of costs of drilling of the Page 2-20C5
well; and

h.

that the Board grant an award of attorney's fees and
costs and such other relief as the Board found
appropriate.
-3-
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5. Graham filed a response to the Request for Agency Action on
August 10, 1990, which asserted the affirmative defenses of the
applicable statute of limitation, equitable doctrine of laches,
equitable doctrine of estoppel, equitable doctrine of waiver, failure
to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, and failure to
name an indispensable party. Graham requested relief from the Board
as follows:
a*
Dismissal of Bennion's Request for Agency Action with
prejudice;
b.

in the alternative, that the matter be set for informal
hearing;

c.

that Bennion's request for a penalty, interest and
attorney's fees be dismissed; and

d.

that Graham be awarded reasonable attorney's fees,
costs and such other relief as the Board deems
appropriate.

6. On August 16, 1990, counsel for the Petitioner, Barbara
Zimmerman, and for the Respondent, Phillip Wm. Lear, appeared before
Ronald J. Firth and Thomas A. Mitchell, Esq. for investigation and
negotiation. At that time the parties exchanged information relevant
to this matter. Graham's counsel took the position that in the
absence of a voluntary or involuntary pooling order, Graham would not
account to or make payments of proceeds to Bennion. However, the
parties agreed to attempt to negotiate a voluntary pooling
agreement. The parties also agreed to file Pre-hearing Issue
Statements prior to the Board hearing of September 27, 1990, setting
forth those issues of fact and law that might remain in dispute
subsequent to the parties negotiations. The parties were unable to
negotiate a voluntary pooling agreement or otherwise settle their
dispute. The parties did prepare and file Pre-hearing Issue
Statements prior to the September 27 hearing. On September 10, 1989,
Graham filed a Motion and Memorandum of Points and Authorities bo
Dismiss Petitioner's Request for Agency Action or in the Alternative
for Summary Judgment.

_4_
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7. On September 25, 1990, Bennion filed a Motion to Continue on
the basis that Bennion had a scheduling conflict with regard to his
company's annual operational meeting in Idaho Falls, Idaho, and that
Bennion's counsel had received no response from the Board to his
letter of September 17, 1990, concerning what the Board would hear
and argue at the hearing of September 27. Bennion filed no
memorandum in opposition to Graham's Motion to Dismiss or for Summary
Judgment.
8- Both parties stipulate in their Pre-hearing Issue Statements
that no pooling order, either voluntary or involuntary is in effect
concerning the wells. Both parties also set forth as a central issue
to be resolved at the hearing, the question of whether or not a
pooling order is a pre-requisite to Bennion receiving proceeds from
the wells.
9. The Board finds that the Motion to Dismiss or in the
alternative for Summary Judgment filed by Graham is properly before
the Board. The Board also finds that the issue of whether or not a
pooling order, voluntary or involuntary, is a pre-requisite for
receiving an accounting under § 40-6-9(7), Utah Code Ann., (1988), is
properly addressed at this time.
10. The Board finds no basis for continuing this matter, in that
Bennion has known at all relevant times of the date of the hearing,
and that Bennion's counsel has been afforded adequate time in which
to respond to the issue concerning the necessity of a pooling order
for the relief requested under § 40-6-9(7), Utah Code Ann., (1988).
11. The Board finds that the wells are located in a drilling
unit established for common development of the entire lands
comprising Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, USM, Duchesne
County, Utah.
12. The Board finds that when the drilling unit was established,
Bennion was the owner of mineral interests in the spaced area which

-5-
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ownership gives rise to correlative rights. By virtue of these
correlative rights he is endowed with the opportunity to obtain his
just and equitable share of the oil and gas from the pool which
underlies the spaced area. The Board finds, based upon the
undisputed evidence, that Bennion owns an undivided mineral interest
in the north half of Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West,
USM., Duchesne County, Utah.
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1. Pursuant to § 40-6-9(4), Utah Code Ann., (1988), Bennion is
entitled tu file a Request for Agency Action with the Board to
conduct a hearing to determine why proceeds to which he alleges he is
entitled have not been paid.
2. Pursuant to § 40-6-9(5), Utah Code Ann., (1988), Bennion is
entitled to have the Division conduct an investigation and
negotiation as to why proceeds from the wells have not been paid.
3. Where the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation, Bennion
is entitled, pursuant to § 40-6-9(6) & (7), Utah Code Ann., (1988),
to have the Board set a hearing to determine if the delay in payment
of proceeds is without reasonable justification.
4. The Board concludes that Graham is not required to furnish
nonconsenting interest owners with monthly statements of costs
incurred, evidence of the quantity of oil or gas produced or the
amount of proceeds in the absence of voluntary or involuntary
pooling. The Board finds a pooling agreement or order to be a
condition precedent to Graham's obligation to provide such an
accounting or payment of proceeds.
5. The Board concludes that Bennion is not legally entitled,
within the meaning at § 40-6-9(1) or (4), Utah Code Ann., (1989), to
payment of proceeds, inasmuch as there is no pooling in effect.

-6-
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6. The Board concludes that it cannot determine the amount of
proceeds which may be payable to Bennion, even where the extent of
his mineral interest is known, until and as part of a pooling order,
the amounts set forth in § 40-6-6(6), Utah Code Ann., (1988), are
determined.
7. The Board concludes that the delay in payment of proceeds to
Bennion is with reasonable justification. Therefore, the Board
concludes that it may not order a complete accounting or order
penalties as provided under § 40-6-9(6) & (7), Utah Code Ann., (1988).
8. In order to obtain the relief Petitioner seeks, he must
exercise his statutory remedies by petitioning the Board for a forced
pooling order under § 40-6-6, Utah Code Ann., (1988), or enter into a
voluntary pooling agreement.
9. The Board concludes that Bennion has failed to state a
claim upon which relief can be granted as to the prayers set forth in
the Findings of Fact at paragraphs, 4.c. thru 4.h. Rule 12(B)(6) of
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides that where, on a Motion to
Dismiss for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be
granted, matters outside the pleadings are presented and not excluded
by the forum, the motion is to be treated as a Motion for Summary
Judgment under Rule 56, U.R.C.P.
10. The Utah Administrative Procedures Act expressly authorizes
the Board, as an administrative agency, to dismiss actions under the
circumstances identified in Rule 56 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, § 63-46B-l(4)(b), Utah Code Ann., (1990).
11. The Board concludes that Graham's Motion for Summary
Judgment should be granted, dismissing with prejudice Bennion1s
requests for relief set forth in the Findings of Fact at paragraphs,
4.c. thru 4.h.

-7-
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12. The relief ordered by the Board in this matter will prevent
the drilling of unnecessary wells, prevent waste, and protect
correlative rights.
Substantial evidence now being available and considered by the
Board upon which to reach its decision, the Board issues the
following:
ORDER
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED THAT:
1. Petitioner's Request for Agency Action as referenced in the
Findings of Fact, paragraphs 4.a, and 4.b is granted.
2. The Board denies the Petitioner's Request for Agency Action
as referenced in Findings of Fact, paragraphs 4.c. thru 4.h. These
requests are dismissed with prejudice pursuant to Respondent Graham's
Motion for Summary Judgment.
3.

Petitioner Bennion's Motion for Continuance is denied.

4. The Board retains exclusive continuing jurisdiction over all
matters covered by this Order and over all the parties affected
thereby, and particularly reserves exclusive and continuing
jurisdiction to make further orders as appropriate and as authorized
by statute and regulation.
DATED this
JOY-W^O^N
199^1
STATE OF UTAH
DIVISION OF OIL, GAS AND MINING

-s-
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ADDENDUM B
BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
STATE OF UTAH
ooOoo
IN THE MATTER OF SAM H. BENNION
FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING GRAHAM
RESOURCES, INC., TO PAY ROYALTY
AND PRODUCTION PAYMENTS ON THE
JENSEN-FENZL #1 WELL 1-20C5,
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH,
RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY,
UTAH, AND THE PAGE #2-20C5 WELL,
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH,
RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY,
UTAH

SUPPLEMENTAL ORDER TO POSTHEARING MOTIONS
DOCKET NO. 90-034
CAUSE NO. 139-66

ooOoo
On the ^ d a v

, 1991, the Board of Oil, Gas and

Mining of the Department of Natural Resources of the State of Utah
granted

the

motion

of

Respondent

Graham

(hereinafter "Graham") for summary judgment.

Resources,

Inc.,

The Board prepared

and delivered to the parties a proposed Order containing Findings
of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

The parties subsequently filed

several post-hearing motions and memoranda in support of those
motions.

There are two matters raised

by the post-hearing

pleadings which are treated separately below.
PETITIONER'S LETTER OF OCTOBER 15. 1990.
AND RESPONDENT'S OBJECTION AND MOTION TO STRIKE
At the regularly scheduled

September 27, 1990, hearing,

argument on Graham's Motion for Summary Judgment was heard by the
Board.

Counsel

for Petitioner

Sam H.

Bennion

(hereinafter

"Bennion"), moved to submit evidence in support of Bennion's case
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in chief.

Graham objected to admission of the evidence on two

grounds:

1) that the evidence in support of Bennion's case in

chief was irrelevant to the issues raised by Graham's Motion for
Summary Judgment, and 2) that the evidence had not been timely
filed pursuant to the Board's Procedural Rules.
The Board sustained Graham's objection to the admission of the
offered evidence on both grounds. At the time the Board sustained
Graham's objection, it determined

that none of the evidence

proffered would be admitted into evidence or constitute a part of
the administrative record.

On October 15, 1990, counsel for

Bennion submitted a letter to the Board requesting that the
evidence be included in the record to make the record complete for
appeal. Graham filed an objection to Bennion's letter and moved to
strike it from the record.

On November 12, 1990, The Board set

Graham's Motion for argument and provided for the submission of
memoranda in support of the parties' positions regarding inclusion
of the proffered evidence in the record.

On December 6, 1990, at

the time set for hearing on Graham's Motion, the Board, after
reviewing the Pleadings filed by each party and hearing oral
argument, retired to consider its decision.
NOW, THEREFORE, the Board, being fully advised in the
premises, does hereby enter its Findings of Fact, Conclusion of Law
and Order:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

The evidence submitted by Bennion at the time of the

hearing was submitted in support of Bennion's original request for
2
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Agency action.
2.

The evidence submitted by Bennion, which the Board ruled

inadmissablef

is a proffer of evidence in the course of the

administrative proceeding.

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Bennion is entitled to make a proffer of evidence and to

have the record reflect the proffer, objection and ruling, and is
entitled to have the proffered evidence included in the hearing
documents to insure that any appeal taken will be upon a complete
record.
ORDER
The

exhibits

twenty-one

entitled

separately

"Plaintiff's Exhibits," containing

numbered

documents, are hereby

ordered

included and made a part of the record as Plaintiff's proffer of
unadmitted evidence at the hearing of September 27, 1990.
OBJECTIONS TO PROPOSED FINDINGS OF FACT,
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW AND ORDER
Respondent Graham has filed an objection to Board's proposed
Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order, and Petitioner
Bennion has filed an objection to Graham Resources' recommendations
regarding

the

proposed

Order

and

has

proposed

his

own

recommendations for the Order. Graham has requested that the Board
expand the scope of its Order to embrace the objection raised by
Graham to Bennion's petition that Bennion has failed to sign a
Division order.

Bennion objects, arguing that the Division order
3
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issue was not within the scope of the September 27th hearing.

Although the issue is raised by the pleadings, the Acting Chairman
of the Board, in teleconferences with counsel for the parties,
requested that the parties restrict their arguments on Graham's
Motion for Summary Judgment to the issue of whether a pooling and
communitization agreement or order is a prerequisite to the relief
sought by the Petitioner.

Argument at the September 27th hearing

was limited to those issues, and the Board finds that it is
unnecessary and would perhaps be inequitable to rule on Graham's
other bases for resisting Petitioner's request.
Mr. Bennion requests that Paragraph 8 of the Findings be
amended to remove the word "stipulation" in reference to the prehearing issue statements filed by each of the parties.

Although

not in the form of a single document signed by both parties, the
Board Finds that both parties did stipulate to the fact that no
pooling order was then in effect.

Bennion also requests that the

Board amend Paragraph 9 to clearly reflect that the only issue
considered by the Board was whether or not a pooling order was a
prerequisite for receiving an accounting.

The issues before the

Board, upon which the Board ruled, were that the existence of a
pooling or communitization agreement or order is a prerequisite to
both an accounting and to payment of proceeds of production.
Accordingly, the Board declines to incorporate the objections
or requests of either party in its Finding of Fact, Conclusions of
4
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Law and Order.

£&

SO ORDERED this^H

&

day of January, 1991,
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING

W. Carter, Acting Chairman
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EXHIBIT "B"
ADDENDUM C

V\:

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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FOR THE DISTRICT OF IDAHci
SAM H. BENNION,
Plaintiff,

)
)
C i v i l No. 8 7 - 4 0 8 2

-VS-

ORDER
GRAHAM RESOURCES, INC.,
Defendant.

)
)

The Court has before it the motions of Graham Resources, Inc.
(Resources) to dismiss and to quash service of process, or in the
alternative, to transfer or stay these proceedings, or again in
the alternative, for a more definite statement.

The Court has

examined the entire record in the case, and in accordance with
the views expressed in the memorandum decision accompanying this
order,
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the motion of
defendant Graham Resources, Inc., to dismiss be, and the same is
hereby, GRANTED.
DATED this

ay of February, 1988.

<r/Zx^*f^«

MARION J. CAL
UNITED STAT

Or (

^^AZIZ^

3TER, CHIEF JUDGE
DISTRICT COURT

EXHIBIT "C"
—

—
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ADDENDUM D

1 . .

i ..i-
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DlirTKI.'T COURT
D'-STRiST OF UTAH

.

fiY

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH
CENTRAL DIVISION

SAM H. BENNION,
MEMORANDUM DECISION
AND ORDER DISMISSING
PLAINTIFF'S
COMPLAINT WITHOUT
PREJUDICE

Plaintiff,
-vsGRAHAM ENERGY, LTD.,

Civil No:

C-88-535W

Defendant.

This matter is before the court on defendant's motion
to dismiss, or in the alternative, to abstain or to stay these
proceedings.
1990.

A hearing was held on this motion on January 4,

The defendant, Graham Energy, Ltd., was represented by

Phillip William Lear.

The plaintiff, Sam H. Bennion ("Bennion")

was represented by Peter Stirba.

Prior to the hearing, the court

had reviewed carefully the memoranda submitted by the parties.
After taking the matter under advisement, the court has further
considered the law and the facts and now renders the following
memorandum decision and order.

Background
Bennion is the owner of an undivided mineral interest
in the N h of Section 20, Township 3 South, Range 5 West, U.S.M.
in Duchesne County, Utah.

In September 1972 the Utah Board of

Oil, Gas and Mining established a 640 acre drilling unit that
includes Section 20. The Board authorized the drilling of one
well.

There is neither a voluntary-pooling agreement nor a

forced-pooling order affecting the mineral interests in this
case.
In April 1973 the Texaco-Gulf-Jensen-Fenzl well was
drilled.

Since the Jensen-Fenzl well did not produce as

expected, the Page well was drilled as a substitute well in
February 1981.
both wells.

In April 1984 Graham Energy assumed operation of

On April 17, 1985, the Board issued an order

authorizing the drilling of a second well.

On July 30, 1985,

Bennion petitioned the Board for an order that would require
Graham Energy to provide an accounting and to make royalty
payments.

The Board has taken no action on Bennion1s petition,

and no hearing has been held.

On June 15, 1988, Bennion filed a

complaint in this action.
Discussion
Graham Energy asks this court to dismiss Bennion1s
complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, for failure to
2

state a claim upon which relief can be granted and for failure to
join an indispensable party.

Alternatively, defendant asks this

court to abstain from taking jurisdiction or to stay this
proceeding until the Board acts on plaintiff's petition-

Bennion

denies that grounds exist to dismiss the complaint and urges the
court to move forward with these proceedings.

For the reasons

stated below, this court believes it is appropriate to abstain
from exercising jurisdiction in this case.

Because we believe

that abstention is appropriate, we do not reach the other issues
presented by this motion.
In Burford v. Sun Oil Co.. 319 U.S. 315 (1943), the
Supreme Court articulated one of three commonly recognized
versions of the abstention doctrine.

The Court stated:

Although a federal equity court does have
jurisdiction of a particular proceeding, it
may, in its sound discretion, whether its
jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of
diversity of citizenship or otherwise,
"refuse to enforce or protect legal rights,
the exercise of which may be prejudicial to
the public interest"; for it "is in the
public interest that federal courts of equity
should exercise their discretionary power
with proper regard for the rightful
independence of state governments in carrying
out their domestic policy."
Id. at 317-18 (footnotes omitted) (quoting United States v. Pern,
289 U.S. 352, 360 (1933) and Pennsylvania v. Williams, 294 U.S.
176, 185 (1935)).

In Burford the Sun Oil Company sought a
3

determination in federal court that an order of the Texas
Railroad Commission was invalid.

The Commission's order gave the

defendant, G.E. Burford, permission to drill oil wells in the
East Texas oil field.

The Supreme Court described the complex

nature of oil and gas regulation, the state's interests in
developing coherent regulation in this area and the detailed
system established in Texas to regulate the production of oil and
gas.

The Court also noted that decisions by the Commission were

subject to judicial review, ultimately by the Texas Supreme
Court.

The Supreme Court emphasized the inability of federal

courts to make an important "contribution to the well organized
system of regulation and review which the Texas statutes provide.
. . . Delay, misunderstanding of local law, and needless federal
conflict with the State policy, are the inevitable product of
this double system of review."

Id. at 327.

Since its decision in Burford the Supreme Court has
made clear that "[a]bstention from the exercise of federal
jurisdiction is the exception, not the rule. • . .

[It] is an

extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District
Court to adjudicate a controversy properly before it." Colorado
River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800,
813 (1976) . Nevertheless, the Tenth Circuit has properly
recognized that abstention is appropriate in certain situations.
4

In Robert-Gav Energy Enterprises v, State Corp, Comm'n of Kansas,
753 F.2d 857 (10th Cir. 1985), the Tenth Circuit followed Burford
and affirmed the dismissal of a federal complaint based upon the
abstention doctrine•

Robert-Gay involved an attack in federal

court on an order by the State Corporation Commission of Kansas,
which placed oil and gas production limits on the plaintiff's
well.

The Tenth Circuit emphasized two factors.

First, the

court reviewed the state regulatory system and found that "the
State of Kansas has 'established its own elaborate review system
for dealing with the geological complexities of oil and gas
fields."1

Id. at 860.

Second, the court examined Kansas

statutes that provide for state judicial review of Commission
decisions and explained:

"We are satisfied that Kansas statutes

provide Tor adequate state court review of orders of the State
Corporation Commission of Kansas."

Id. at 861. The Tenth

Circuit concluded that abstention under Burford was proper.
We believe the present case is one in which abstention
is appropriate under Burford and cases following it.
factors support this conclusion.

Several

First, Utah, like Texas and

Kansas, has a strong interest in developing a coherent policy for
the production of oil and gas.

The Utah State Supreme Court,

citing the Utah Oil and Gas Conservation Act, explained that Utah
has an "interest in developing natural resources in a manner that
5

will prevent waste, foster greater ultimate recovery, and protect
the correlative rights of all property owners."

Bennion v. Utah

State Bd. of Oil, Gas & Mining, 675 P.2d 1135, 1137 (Utah 1983).
Utah also has other legitimate interests such as insuring that
tax revenues flow from the production of oil and gas.
Second, in pursuit of these and related interests, Utah
has established an elaborate system to regulate the production of
oil and gas.

In 1953 the Utah State Legislature enacted the Oil

and Gas Conservation Act.

Utah Code Ann. §§ 40-6-1 -18 (1988).

Within the State Department of Natural Resources the Act
established the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining.
§ 40-6-15 (1988).

Utah Code Ann.

The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining is the

policymaking body for the Division, Utah Code Ann. § 4 0-6-4
(1988), and the Board is given broad jurisdiction over oil and
gas production.

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-5 (1988).

Of particular

importance in this case, "[a]ny party entitled to proceeds of
production in oil and gas may file a petition with the Board of
Oil, Gas and Mining to conduct a hearing to determine why these
proceeds have not been paid.11

Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9(4) (Supp.

1989) . The Board must attempt to resolve the matter first by
investigation and negotiation with the parties.
§ 40-6-9(5) (Supp. 1989).

Utah Code Ann.

If negotiations fail, the Board is

authorized to conduct a hearing.

Utah Code Ann. § 4 0-6-9(6)
6

(Supp. 1989) . The Board has the power to "summon witnesses,
administer oaths, and require the production of records, books,
and documents for examination . . .'? Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-11(1)
(1988).

"If, after a hearing, the board finds the payment of

proceeds delay is without reasonable justification, it may order
a complete accounting . . . " and assess penalties and interest.
Utah Code Ann. § 40-6-9(7) (Supp. 1989).

The Board may also

assess fines for violation of the statutory provisions "or any
permit, rule, or order" made pursuant to the statute.

Utah Code

Ann. § 40-6-11(4) (1988).
Third, the statute provides for judicial review of -the
Board's decisions.

Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2 (Supp. 1989)

the Utah State Supreme Court has jurisdiction to review the
Board's final orders.
Finally, this case, apparently unlike Colorado River
Water Conservation Dist. v. United States. 424 U.S. 800 (1976),
raises questions "bearing on state policy . . . "

Id. at 815.

The parties ask this court to resolve questions involving what
duties well operators owe to mineral interest owners and the
circumstances under which multiple wells may be drilled in each
drilling unit.

"These questions of regulation of the industry by

the State administrative agency . . . so clearly involves basic
problems of [state] policy that equitable discretion should be
7

exercised to give the [state] courts the first opportunity to
consider them.

Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 332 (1943),

Accordingly,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the plaintiff's complaint is
dismissed without prejudice.
This memorandum decision and order will suffice as the
court's action on defendant's motion.
prepared by counsel.
Dated t h i s

No further order need be

/
^> xr—~~cTay of February, 1990.

David K. Winder
United States District Judge

Mailed a copy of the -fejFeqc^pg to the following named
counsel this J X ~"*~ day of February, ' l"590'.
Phillip Wm. Lear, Esq.
R. Stephen Marshall, Esq.
50 South Main, Suite 1600
P. 0. Box 45340
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145
Peter Stirba, Esq.
Reid Tateoka, Esq.
Bryan A. Larson, Esq.
1200 Kennecott Building
10 East South Temple
Salt Lake City, Utah 84133

Secretary
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ADDENDUM E

BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING
DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL RESOURCES
STATE OF UTAH

IN THE MATTER OF SAM H.
BENNION FOR AN ORDER REQUIRING
GRAHAM RESOURCES, INC. TO PAY
ROYALTY AND PRODUCTION
PAYMENTS ON THE JENSEN-FENZL
#1 WELL 1-20C5, SECTION 20,
TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH, RANGE 5
WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY, UTAH,
AND THE PAGE #2-20C5 WELL,
SECTION 20, TOWNSHIP 3 SOUTH,
RANGE 5 WEST, DUCHESNE COUNTY,
UTAH.

ORDER DISMISSING PETITION
OF
SAM H. BENNION
Docket No. 85-047
Cause No. 139-47

This matter came on for hearing before the Board of Oil,
Gas and Mining ("Board") on June 28, 1990, on the motions of Graham
Resources, Inc. ("Graham") to dismiss the petition (Request for
Agency Action) of Sam H. Bennion; and this matter having been duly
considered upon oral and written arguments of counsel and the Board
having been fully advised in the premises;
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Graham's motion to dismiss is
granted without prejudice on grounds that the petitioner, Sam H.
Bennion, has failed to timely prosecute.

The petitioner is

admonished that should he decide to refile this matter, the Board
questions its authority to grant the relief requested until such

time as the petitioner's interests have been either voluntarily or
forced-pooled into the drilling unit.
DATED this j[\

day of July, 1990.
STATE OF UTAH
BOARD OF OIL, GAS AND MINING

Approved as to form:

Peter Stirba, Esq.
Attorney for Petitioner

Phillip Wm. Lear, Esq.
Attorney for Respondent
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ADDENDUM F
STATE AFFAIRS IN GENERAL

(b) The Utah Rules of Evidence apply injudicial proceedings under this
section.
Hiatory; C, 1953,63-46b-15, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, 5 271; 1988, ch. 72, § 25.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendmeat, effective April 25,1986, deleted "except
that final agency action from infonnal a^judi*
cative proceedings based on a record shall be
reviewed by the district courts on the record

according to the standards of Subsection
6346b-16(4r at the end in Subsection (l)(a)
and made minor stylistic change
Effective Dates. — LSWB 1987, cL 161,
§ 315 makes the act effective on January 1>
193$^

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Fraction of district court.
Section 63-46b-16(l) provides that all final
agency decisions through formal adjudicative
proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Sttpreme Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore,

the district court will no longer function as intermediata appellate court except to review informal adjudicative proceedings dp novo pursu:
ant to Subsection (IXa) of this section. In re
Topik, 762 P.2d 82 (Utah Ci Ajpp. 1988).

63-46b-16, Judicial review — Formal adjudicative proceedings.
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudicative proceedings.
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court,
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court.
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of
Appellate Procedure, except that:
(a) all parties to the Teview proceedings may stipulate to shorten, summarize, or organize the record;
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and
copies for the record:
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or
(ii) according to any other provision of law.
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of t|ie agency's
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substantially prejudiced by any of the following;
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agfency action
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied;
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any statute;
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution;
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law;
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-making process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure;
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a
decisionmaking body or were subject to disqualification;
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when
viewed in light of the whole record before the court;
(h) the agency action is:
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute;
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency;
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justifies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious*
History: C, 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L.
1987, ch, 181, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26.
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amendment, effective April 25,1988, substituted "As
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the
Court of Appeals" for 'The Supreme Court or
other appellate court designated by etatute* in
Subjection (1); inserted "with the appropriate

appellate court" in Subsection (2Xa); and euV
stituted "appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate ProcedUreM in Subsection* (2)(a) and (2)(b).
Effective Dates. — Law* 1987, ch. 161,
§ 3 ^ mafo& the act effective on January 1,
jgg^

NOTES TO DECISIONS
Function of district court
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency
decisions through formal adjudicative proceedings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme
Court or Court of Appeal** Therefore, the dis-

trict court will no longer function as intermediate appellate court except to review informal
adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to
§ 63-46b-l5(lXa). In re Topik, 761 P.2d- 32
(Utah Ct App. 1S88)»

63-46M7. Judicial review — Type of relief.
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an Appellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the
extent expressly authorized by statute.
(b) In granting relief, the court may;
(i) order agency action required by law,
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law;
(iii) set aside or modify agency action;
(iv) enjoin or stay the effective date of agency action; or
(v) remand the matter to the agency for fiirther proceedings,
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are ireviewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute*
History; C. 1963,6S-46b-17, enacted by L.
1987, ch. 161, § 273.
Effective Dates. — Law* 1987, ch. 161,

§ 315 makes the act effective on January 1,
1988.
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ADDENDUM G
BOARD AND DIVISION OF OIL, GAS AND MINING

40-6-1

CHAPTER 6
BOARD AND DIVISION OF OIL, GAS
AND MINING
Sunset Act - - Section 63-55-7 provides that the Division of Oil, Gas and Mining terminates on
July 1, 1993.
Section
40-6-1.
40-6-2.
40-6-3.
40-6-4.

Section
Declaration of public interest.
40-6-10. Procedures — Adjudicative proceedings — Emergency orders — HearDefinitions.
ing examiners.
Waste prohibited.
Board of Oil, Gas and Mining ere- 40-6-11. Power to summon witnesses, administer oaths and require production
ated — Functions — Appointment
of records — Enforcement — Penof members — Terms — Chairman
alties for violation of chapter or
— Quorum.
rules — Illegal oil or gas — Civil
40-6-5. Jurisdiction of board — Rules.
liability.
40-6-6. Drilling units — Establishment —
Pooling of interests — Order —- 40-6-12. Evasion of chapter or rules — Penalties — Limitation of actions.
Operation.
40-6-7. Agreements for repressuring or pres- 40-6-13. Restrictions of production not authorized.
sure maintenance or cycling or recycling operations — Plan for de- 40-6-14. Tax on oil and gas at well — Use —
Collection — Penalty and interest
velopment and operation of pool or
on delinquencies — Payment
field.
when product taken in-kind — In40-6-8. Field or pool units — Procedure for
terests exempt.
establishment — Operation.
40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production — 40-6-15. Division created — Functions — Director of division — Qualifications
Proceeding on petition to deterof program administrators.
mine cause of nonpayment —
Remedies.
40-6-16. Duties of division.
40-6-9.5. Permits for crude oil production — 40-6-17, Cooperative research and development projects.
Application — Bond requirement
— Closure of facilities — Avail- 40-6-18. Lands subject to chapter.
ability of records.

40-6-1. Declaration of public interest.
It is declared to be in the public interest to foster, encourage, and promote
the development, production, and utilization of natural resources of oil and
gas in the state of Utah in such a manner as will prevent waste; to authorize
and to provide for the operation and development of oil and gas properties in
such a manner that a greater ultimate recovery of oil and gas may be obtained
and that the correlative rights of all owners may be fully protected; to provide
exclusive state authority over oil and gas exploration and development as
regulated under the provisions of this chapter; to encourage, authorize, and
provide for voluntary agreements for cycling, recycling, pressure maintenance, and secondary recovery operations in order that the greatest possible
economic recovery of oil and gas may be obtained within the state to the end
that the land owners, the royalty owners, the producers, and the general
public may realize and enjoy the greatest possible good from these vital natural resources.
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(12) "Producer" means the owner or operator
of a well capable of producing oil and gas.
(13) "Product" means any commodity made
from oil and gas.
(14) "Waste" means:
(a) the inefficient, excessive, or improper
use or the unnecessary dissipation of oil or
gas or reservoir energy;
(b) the inefficient storing of oil or gas;
(c) the locating, drilling, equipping, operating, or producing of any oil or gas well in a
manner that causes reduction in the quantity of oil or gas ultimately recoverable from
a reservoir under prudent and economical
operations, or that causes unnecessary wells
to be drilled, or that causes the loss or destruction of oil or gas either at the surface or
subsurface;
(d) the production of oil or gas in excess of:
(i) transportation or storage facilities;
(ii) the amount reasonably required
to be produced in the proper drilling,
completing, testing, or operating of a
well or otherwise utilized on the lease
from which it is produced; and
(e) underground or above ground waste in
the production or storage of oil or gas.
(15) Oil and gas as defined in this chapter
shall not include gaseous or liquid substances derived from coal, oil shale, tar sands, or other hydrocarbons classified as synthetic fuels.
isas
40-6-3. Waste prohibited.
The waste of oil or gas is prohibited.
40-6-4.

1983

Board of Oil, Gas and Mining created —
Functions — Appointment of members
— Terms — Chairman — Quorum.
(1) There is created within the Department of Natural Resources the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining. The
board shall be the policymaking body for the Division
of Oil, Gas and Mining. Upon the effective datejof this
act the terms of the present members oi .tlhe/ board
shall expire.
!
'' ' j
(2) The board shall then consist of seven members
appointed by the governor, with the advice and consent of the Senate. No more than four members shall
be from the same political party. The members shall
have the following qualifications:
(a) two members knowledgeable in mining
matters;
(b) two members knowledgeable in oil and gas
matters;
(c) one member knowledgeable in ecological
and environmental matters;
(d) one member who is a private land owner,
owns a mineral or royalty interest and is knowledgeable in those interests; and
ie> one member who is know\edgeab\e \n geological matters.
(3) The terms of office of four of the members first
appointed shall expire March 1, 1985, and the terms
of the remaining three members shall expire on
March 1, 1987. Their successors shall be appointed
for terms of four years. Vacancies occurring by reason
of death, resignation, or other cause shall be filled by
the appointment of another person by the governor,
with the advice and consent of the Senate, for the
unexpired term of the person whose office was vacated and shall have the same qualifications as his
predecessor.
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(4) The board shall appoint its chairman from the
membership. Four members of the board shall constitute a quorum for the transaction of business and the
holding of hearings.
isss
40-6-5. Jurisdiction of board — Rules.
(1) The board has jurisdiction over all persons and
property necessary to enforce this chapter. The board
shall enact rules in accordance with the Utah Administrative Rulemaking Act.
(2) The board shall adopt rules and make orders as
necessary to administer the following provisions:
(a) Ownership of all facilities for the production, storage, treatment, transportation, refining,
or processing of oil and gas shall be identified.
(b) Well logs, directional surveys, and reports
on well location, drilling, and production shall be
made and filed with the division. Logs of wells
marked "confidential" shall be kept confidential
for one year after the date on which the log is
required to be filed, unless the operator gives
written permission to release the log at an earlier date. Production reports shall be:
(i) filed monthly;
(ii) accurate; and
(iii) in a form that reasonably serves the
needs of state agencies and private fee
owners.
(c) Monthly reports from gas processing plants
shall be filed with the division.
(d) Wells shall be drilled, cased, operated, and
plugged in such manner as to prevent:
(i) the escape of oil, gas, or water out of
the reservoir in which they are found into
another formation;
(ii) the detrimental intrusion of water into
an oil or gas reservoir;
(iii) the pollution of fresh water supplies
by oil, gas, or salt water;
(iv) blowouts;
(v) cavings;
(vi) seepages; and
(vii) fires.
(e) The drilling of wells shall not commence
without an adequate and approved supply of
water as required by Chapter 3, Title 73. Thii
provision is not intended to impose any additional legal requirements, but to assure that existing legal requirements concerning the use of
water have been met prior to the commencement
of drilling.
(f) The operator shall furnish a reasonable performance bond or other good and sufficient
surety, conditioned for the performance of the
duty to:
'.
(i) plug each dry or abandoned well; »^J*
(ii) repair each well causing waste or pollution; and
*
(iii) maintain and restore the well site.
ig> Production from wells shall be separated
into oil and gas and measured by means and
upon standards that will be prescribed by the
board and will reflect current industry sta*
dards.
(h) Crude oil obtained from any reserve pit,
disposal pond or pit, or similar facility, and anjr
accumulation of nonmerchantable waste crude
oil shall be treated and processed, as prescribed
by the board.
(i) Any person who produces, sells, purchases,
acquires, stores, transports, refines, or procesMt
oil or gas or injects fluids for cycling, presfun
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maintenance, secondary or enhanced recovery, or
and establish drilling units for each zone, which units
salt water disposal in this state shall maintain
may differ in size and shape from those established in
complete and accurate records of the quantities
any other zone The order shall include:
produced, sold, purchased, acquired, stored,
<a> the acreage to he embraced within each
transported, refined, processed, or injected for a
drilling unit and the shape of each drilling unit
period of at least six years. The records shall be
as determined by the board but the unit shall not
available for examination by the hoard or its
be smaller than the maximum area that can be
agents at any reasonable time. Rules enacted to
efficiently and economically drained by one well;
administer th.is subsection shall be consistent
and
with applicable federal requirements.
(b) the direction that no more than one well
(j) Any person with an interest in a lease shall
shall be drilled for production from the common
be notified when all or part of that interest in the
source of supply on any drilling unit, and the
lease is sold or transferred.
authorized location of the well.
(3) The board has the authority to regulate:
(2) The bourd may modify the order to provide an
(a) all operations for and related to the producexception to the authorized location of the well when
tion of oil or gas including:
the board finds such a modification to be reasonably
(i) drilling, testing, equipping, completnecessary.
ing, operating, producing, and plugging of
(3) An order establishing drilling units for a pool
wells; and
shall cover all lands determined by the board to be
(ii) reclamation of sites;
underlaid by the pool, and the order may be modified
(b) the spacing and location of wells;
by the board to include additional areas determined
(c) operations to increase ultimate recovery,
to be underlaid by the pool.
such as:
(4» After an order fixing drilling units has been
(i) cycling of gas;
entered by the board, the drilling of any well into the
(ti) the maintenance of pressure; and
pool at a location other thnn authorized by the order,
(iii) the introduction of gas, water, or
is prohibited. The operation of any well drilled in vioother substances into a reservoir;
lation of an order fixing drilling units is prohibited.
(d) the disposal of salt water and oil-field The board may modify the order to decrease or inwastes;
crease the size of the drilling units or permit addi(e) the underground and surface storage of oil,
tional wells to be drilled within the established units.
gas, or products; and
(5) Two or more owners within a drilling unit may
(0 the flaring of gas from an oil well.
pool their interests for the development and operation
(4) For the purposes of administering this chapter, of the unit. In the absence of voluntary pooling, the
the board may designate:
hoard may enter an order pooling all interests in the
(a) wells as:
drilling unit for the development and operation. The
(i) oil wells; or
order shall be made upon terms and conditions that
(ii) gas wells; and
are just and reasonable. Operations incident to the
(b) pools as:
drilling of a well upon any portion of a unit covered
(i) oil pools; or
by a pooling order shall be deemed for all purposes to
(ii) gas pools
l»e the conduct of the operations upon each separately
(5) The board has exclusive jurisdiction over:
owned tract in the unit by the several owners. That
(a) class II injection wells, as defined by the
portion of the production hllocet^i or applicable to
. federal Environmental Protection Agency or any each tract included il^ affunit {wver^d by a pooling
successor agency; and
order shall, when produced, be1 deified far all pur(b) pits and ponds in relation to these injection
poses to have been pndduced from each tract by a well
wells.
•
drilled thereon.
(6) The board has* jurisdiction:
(6) Each pooling order shall permit the drilling and
(a) to hear any questions regarding multiple operation of a well on the drilling unit by any owner
mineral development conflicts with oil and gas
within the drilling unit, and shall provide for the payoperations if there:
ment of the costs, including a reasonable charge for
(i) is potential injury to other mineral desupervision and storage facilities, as provided in this
posits on the same lands; or
subsection.
(ii) are simultaneous or concurrent operaIn relation to each owner who refuses to agree to
tions conducted by other mineral owners or
hear his proportionate share of the costs of the drilllessees affecting the same lands; and
ing and operation of j jtbio well (the nonconsenting
(b) to enter its order or rule with respect to owner), the order sh^l||pr<|uide for reimbursement to
:
those question?.
the owner paying for t|w drilling and operation of the
<„ (7) The board has enforcement powers with respect
well (consenting ow«eta| ij for the nonconsenting
• operators of minerals other than oil and gas as are owner's share of the litiiMf put of, and only out of,
t at forth in Section 40-6-11, for the sole purpose of
production from the un,kta(kijibutable to his tract. The
I fjfercing multiple mineral development issues, less
board is authorized to! provide that the consenting
owners shall own and bej Entitled to receive all pro- #4-6. Drilling units — Establishment — Poolduction from the well, applicable to each tract or in,
ing of interests — Order — Operation.
terest, and obligations jUyjable out of production,
(I) The Board of Oil, Gas and Mining, may order
until the consenting f r i e r s have been paid the
• It establishment of drilling units covering any pool. amount due under the w ^ P of the pooling order or
*' tfiuch orders shall be made upon terms and condiorder relating to the drillM; unit. In the event of any
^tm that are just and reasonable. Drilling units dispute as to such costs,itntfboard shall determine the
. fell be of uniform size and shape for the entire pool
proper costs. The order! Biiiil provide that each conI ok* the board finds that it must make an exception
senting owner shall be jnJitltljed to receive, subject to
/ I n to geologic or geographic or other factors. When
royalty or similar obligationk the share of the pro^*mury th* board may divide any pool into zones
duction of the well apnlijjab e to his interest in the
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unit, and, unless he has agreed otherwise, his proportionate part of the nonconsenting owner's share of
such production until costs are recovered as provided
in this subsection; and that each nonconsenting
owner shall he entitled to_rcccMve, suhjecTj^jjuyttit^
^ oFTrtntriar obi i gat ions .The share of production from
the well appTicahle'to HislHteresTTiif nieTunlt after the
^consenting owners have recoveredTrom the~1ioricon-_
senting owner's share of productXonjthe followirig:
(a) Tn respect to every such wellllJO^rof the
nonconsenting owner's share of the cost of surface equipment beyond the wellhead connections
(including, but not limited to, stock tanks, separators, treaters, pumping equipment, and piping), plus 100% of the nonconsenting owner's
share of the cost of operation of the well commencing with first production and continuing
until the consenting owners have recovered these
costs, it being intended that the nonconsenting
owner's share of these costs and equipment will
be that interest which would have been chargeable to the nonconsenting owner had he initially
agreed to pay his share of the costs of the well
from the beginning of the operation; and
(b) An amount to be determined by the board
but not less than 150% nor to exceed 200% of that
portion of the costs and expenses of staking the
location, wellsite preparation, rights-of-way, rigging up, drilling, reworking, deepening or plugging back, testing, and completing, and the cost
of equipment in the well (to and including the
wellhead connections), after deducting any cash
contributions received by the consenting owners.
A reasonable interest charge may be included if
the board finds it appropriate.
(7) The order shall provide that:
(a) A nonconsenting owner of a tract in a drilling unit, which tract is subject to a lease or other
contract for the development of oil and gas, shall
have the costs provided in Subsection (6) paid
from the production attributable to that tract.
Any royalty interest or other interest not liable
for the costs of production shall be jpnid J>y the
nonconsenting owner and not from tpd production attributable to the tract until the consenting
owners have recovered the costs as provided in
Subsection (6).
' t
(b) A nonconsenting owner of a tract in a drilling unit, which is not subject to a lease or other
contract for the development of oil and gas, shall
receive as a royalty the average landowners royalty attributable to each tract within the drilling
unit, determined prior to the commencement of
drilling and payable from the production allocated to each tract until the consenting owners
have recovered the costs as provided in Subsection (6).
(8) The operator of a well umjerji pooling order in
which there a,re nonconsenting o^vners sRairttarnjsfi
the nonconsenting owners with 'monthly statements
of all costs incurred, together with the quantity of oil
or gas produced, and the amount of proceeds realized
from the sale of this production during the preceding
month. If and when the consenting owners recover
from a nonconsenting owner's relinquished interest
the amounts provided for in Subsection (6) of this
section, the relinquished interest of the nonconsenting owner shall automatically revert to him; and the
nonconsenting owner shall from that time own the
same interest in the well and the production from it,
and be liable for the further costs of the operation as
if he had participated in the initial drilling and oper-
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ation. These costs are payable out of production unless otherwise agreed between the nonconsenting
owner and the operator.
IMS
40-6-7.

Agreements for represauring or pressure maintenance or cycling or recycling operations — Finn for development and operation of pool or field.
(1) An agreement for repressuring or pressure
maintenance operations, cycling or recycling operations, including the extraction and separation of liquid hydrocarbons from natural gas, or for carrying on
any other methods of unit or cooperative development
or operation of a field or pool or a part of either, is
authorized and may be performed, and shall not be
held or construed to violate any statutes relating to
trusts, monopolies, or contracts and combinations in
restraint of trade, if the agreement is approved by the
board as being in the public interest and promotes
conservation, increases ultimate recovery and prevents waste of oil or gas provided the agreement protects the correlative rights of each owner or producer.
(2) A plan for the development and operation of a
pool or field shall be presented to the board and may
be approved after notice and hearing.
tees
40-6-8.

Field or pool units — P r o c e d u r e for establishment — Operation.
(1) The board may hold a hearing to consider the
need for the operation as a unit of one or more pools
or parts of them in a field.
(2) The board shall make an order providing for
the unit operation of a pool or part of it, if the board
finds that:
(a) Such operation is reasonably necessary for
the purposes of this chapter; and
(b) The value of the estimated additional recovery of oil or gas substantially exceeds the estimated additional cost incident to conducting such
operations.
(3) The order shall prescribe a plan for unit operations that shall include:
(a) a description of the lands and of the pool or
pools or parts of them to be so operated, termed
the unit area;
(b) a statement of the nature of the operations
contemplated;
(c) an allocation to the separately owned tracts
in the unit area of all the oil and gas that is
produced from the unit area and is saved, being
the production that is not used in the conduct of
operations on the unit area or not unavoidably
lost. The allocation shall be in accord with the
agreement, if any, of the interested parties. If
there is no such agreement, the board *hall determine the relative value, from evidence inuM»-v*
duced at the hearing of the separately owned
tracts in the unit area, exclusive of physical
equipment, for development of oil and gas by unit
operations, and the production allocated to each
tract shall be the proportion that the relative
value of each tract so determined bears to the
relative value of all tracts in the unit area;
(d) a provision for adjustment among the
owners of the unit area (not including royalty
owners) of their respective investment in wells,
tanks, pumps, machinery, materials, equipment,
and other things and services of value attributable to the unit operations. The amount to be
charged unit operations for any such item shall
be determined by the owners of the unit area (not
including royalty owners); but if the owners of
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the unit area are unable to agree upon the
amount or correctness, the hoard shall determine
them. The net amount charged against the owner
of an interest in a separately owned Unci, shall be
considered expense of unit operation chargeable
against his interest in the tract. The adjustments
provided for may be treated separately and handled by agreements separate from the unitization
agreement;
(e) a provision providing how the costs of unit
operations, including capital investments, shall
be determined and charged to the separately
owned tracts and how these costs shall be paid,
including a provision providing a procedure for
the unit production allocated to an owner who
does not pay the share of the cost of unit operations charged to such owner, or the interest of
such owner, to be sold and the proceeds applied to
the payment of such costs. The operator of the
unit shall have a first and prior lien for costs
incurred pursuant to the plan of unitization upon
each owner's oil and gas rights and his share of
unitized production to secure the payment of
such owner's proportionate part of the cost of developing and operating the unit area. This lien
may be established and enforced in the same
manner as provided by Sections 38-1-8 to 38-1-26
inclusive. For such purposes any nonconsenting
owner shall be deemed to have contracted wi(h
the unit operator for his proportionate part of the
cost of developing and operating the unit area. A
transfer or conversion of any owner's interest or
any portion of it, however accomplished, after the
effective date of the order creating the unit, shall
not relieve the transferred interest of the operator's lien on said interest for the cost and expense
of unit operations;
(0 a provision, if necessary, for carrying or
otherwise financing any owner who elects to be
carried or otherwise financed, allowing a reasonable interest charge for such service payable out
of such owner's share of the production;
(g) a provision for the supervision and conduct
of the unit operations, in respect to which each
owner shall have a percentage vote corresponding to the percentage of the costs of unit operations chargeable against the interest of the
owner;
(h) the time N when the unit operations shall
commence, and the manner in which, and the
circumstances under which, the unit operations
shall terminate;
(i) such additional provisions that are found to
be appropriate for carrying on the unit operations, and for the protection of correlative rights;
and
(j) the designation of a unit operator.
(4) No order of the board providing for unit operations of a pool or pools shall become effective unless
and until the plan for unit operations prescribed by
the division has been approved in writing by those
owners who, under the board's order, will be required
to pay 70%- of the costs of the unit operation, and also
by the owners of 70% of the production or proceeds
that will be credited to interests which are free of
cost, such as royalties, overriding royalties, and production payments, and the board has made a finding,
either in the order providing for unit operations or in
• supplemental order, that the plan for unit operations has been so approved. If the persons owning
required percentage of interest in that unit area do
not approve the plan for unit operations within a pe-
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riod of six months from the date on which the order
providing for unit operations is made, the order shall
be inenYctive and shall be revoked by the board unleHH lor good i aiiHt* KIIOWII the board extends this time.
<f>> An oider providing for unit operations may be
amended by an order made by the board in the same
manner and subject to the same conditions as an original order providing for unit operations, provided:
(a) If such an amendment affects only the
rights and interests of the owners, the approval
of the amendment by the owners of royalty, overriding royally, production payments and other
such interests which are free of costs shall not be
required.
(b) No such order of amendment shall change
the percentage for the allocation of oil and gas as
established for any separately owned tract by the
original order, or change the percentage for allocation of cost as established for any separately
owned tract by the original order.
(6) The board, by an order, may provide for the
unit operation of a pool or pools or parts thereof that
embrace a unit area established by a previous order
of the division. The order, in providing for the allocation of unit production, shall first treat the unit area
previously established as a single tract, and the portion of the unit production allocated shall then be
allocated among the separately owned tracts included
in the previously established unit area in the same
proportions of | a s | those specified in the previous order
(7) An order may provide for unit operations on
less than the whole of a pool where the unit area is of
such size and shape as may be reasonably required
for that purpose, and the conduct will have no adverse effect upon other portions of the pool.
(8) All operations, including, but not limited to, the
commencement, drilling, or operation of a well upon
any portion of the unit area shall be deemed for all
purposes the conduct of such operations upon each
separately owned tract in the unit area by the several
owners. The portions of the unit production allocated
to a separately ownod tfrwjt in a uflitjarea shall, when
produced, be detjmedj! fyr all purposes, to have been
actually produced frohi such tract1 by a well drilled.
Operations conducted pursuant to an order of the
board providing for unit operations Bhall constitute a
fulfillment of all the express or implied obligations
for each lease or contract covering lands in the unit
area to the extent that compliance with such obligations cannot l>e had because of the order of the board.
<9> The portion of the unit production allocated to
any tract, and the proceeds from the sale, shall be the
property and income of the several owners, subject to
the rights of royalty owners, to whom, or to whose
credit, they are allocated or payable under the order
providing for utity|||)fflfrrations.
(10> No diiivihiK jftrallr or other contract relating to
the sale or purc)i|$p JM productjon from a separately
owned tract sha|) bin;1(jrmmated by the order providing for unit 0|x4ajim|» but shall remain in force and
apply to oil andj$*s Allocated to such tract until terminated in accoijefonitt with the provisions thereof.
(11) Except tyfe^'iMctent that the parties affected
agree and ad pitivjiicWl in (e) of Subsection (3) of this
section, no ordtir JpV^yjding for unit operations shall
be construed, to jnUbU tin a transfer of all or any part
of the title of njrjl person to the oil and gas rights in
any tract in thel tj|mtj')irea. All property, whether real
or personal, ithatJllrhflW be acquired in the conduct of
unit operations M a u n d e r shall he acquired for the
account of the (iv^p'r* (within the unit area and shall
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(15) Oil and gas as defined in this chapter shall not include gaseous or
liquid substances derived from coal, oil shale, tar sands, or other hydrocarbons classified as synthetic fuels.
History: C. 1953, 40-6-2, enacted by L.
1963, ch. 205,1 1; 1985, ch. 94, 5 1; 1989, ch.
86, 5 1.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective July l, 1989, added Subsection

(7); redesignated former Subsections (7) and (8)
as present Subsections (8) and (9); added
present Subsection (10); and redesignated former Subsections (9) to (13) as present Subsections (11) to (15).

40-6-4- Board of Oil, Gas and Mining created — Functions
— Appointment of members — Terms — Chairman — Quorum*
Sunset Act. — Section 63-55-240 provides
that the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining is repealed July 1, 1993.

40-6-9. Proceeds from sale of production — Payment of
proceeds — Requirements — Proceeding on petition to determine cause of nonpayment — Remedies — Penalties.
(1) The oil and gas proceeds derived from the sale of production from any
well producing oil, gas, or related hydrocarbons in the state shall be paid to all
persons legally entitled to these payments commencing not later than 180
days after the first day of the month following the date of first sale and
thereafter not later than 30 days after the end of the calendar month within
which payment is received by the payor for production unless other periods or
arrangements are provided for in a valid contract with the person entitled to
the proceeds. The payment shall be made directly to the person or persons
entitled to the payment by the payor. The payment is considered to have been
made upon deposit in the United States mail.
(2) Payments shall be remitted to the person or persons entitled to proceeds
from production annually for the aggregate of up to 12 months accumulation
of proceeds if the total amount owed is $100 or less.
(3) Any delay in determining any person legally entitled to an interest in
the proceeds from production does not affect payments to all other persons
entitled to payment. In instances where accrued payments cannot be made for
any reason within the time limits specified in Subsection (2), the payor shall
deposit all proceeds credited to the eventual oil and gas proceeds owner to an
escrow account in a federally insured bank or savings and loan institution
using a standard escrow document form which deposit shall earn interest at
the highest rate being offered by that institution for the amount and term of
such demand deposits. The escrow agent may commingle money received into
escrow from any one lessee or operator, purchaser, or other party legally
responsible for payment. Payment of principal and accrued interest from these
accounts shall be paid by the escrow agent to all persons legally entitled to
them within 30 days from the date of receipt by the escrow agent of final legal
determination of entitlement to the payment. Applicable escrow fees shall be
deducted from the payments.
36
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(4) Any party entitled to proceeds of production in oil ana gas may iile a
petition with the Board of Oil, Gas and Mining to conduct a hearing to determine why these proceeds have not been paid.
(5) Upon receipt of the petition the board shall set the matter for investigation and negotiation by the" division within 60 days.
(6) If the matter cannot be resolved by negotiation as of that date, the board
may set a hearing within 30 days. If the board does not set a hearing, ail
information gathered during the investigation and negotiation shall be given
to the petitioner who may then seek a remedy in the court system.
(7) If, after a hearing, the board finds the payment of proceeds delay is
without reasonable justification, it may order a complete accounting and require the proceeds and interest to be paid into an interest bearing escrow
account and set a date not later than 90 days for final distribution. The board
may also assess a penalty of up to 25% of the proceeds and interest at the rate
of V/2% per month from the date of delinquency until paid upon finding that
the delay of payment of proceeds was known and intentional.
(8) The penalty provisions of this chapter do not apply in the following
instances:
(a) the payor fails to make such payment otherwise required under this
section in good faith reliance upon a title opinion by a licensed Utah
attorney objecting to the lack of good and marketable title of record in the
party claiming entitlement to payment and furnishes a copy of the opinion to the party for necessary curative action;
(b) the payor receives information which, in the payor's good faith judgment, brings into question the entitlement of the person claiming the
right to the payment to receive that payment or which has rendered
unmarketable the title of the payment, or which may expose the payor to
the risk of multiple liability or liability to third parties if the payment is
made. In that event, the payor may suspend those payments otherwise
required by this chapter or, at the request and expense of the party claiming entitlement whereupon the payor's own initiative, may interplead
such fund in the manner provided by law in order to resolve such claims
and avoid liability under this chapter;
(c) the total amount of oil and gas proceeds in possession of the payor
owed to the owner thereof making claim to payment is less than $100 at
the end of any month; or
(d) the party entitled to payment has failed or refused to execute a
division or transfer order acknowledging the proper interest to which the
party claims to be entitled and setting forth the mailing address to which
payment may be directed.
History: G. 1953, 40-6-9, enacted by L.
1983, ch. 205, § 1; 1989, ch. 86, & 2.
Amendment Notes. — The 1989 amendment, effective July 1, 1989, substituted
present Subsections^ 1) to (4) for former Subsection (1) which read "The owner of a royalty,
overriding royalty, production payment,
unleaeed working interest, or any other inter-
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est entitled to share in the proceeds from the
sale of production from a well who has not received these proceeds on a regular basis may
file a petition with the Board of Oil, Gas and
Mining to conduct a hearing to determine why
these proceeds have not been paid," redesignated former Subsections 121 to (41 tf« present
Subsections (5) to (7), and added Subsection (8).

R619-105-100

NATURAL RESOURCES

BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS, AND
MINING DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
STATE OF UTAH
In the Matter of the
Request for Agency
Action of John Doe,
Petitioner for

Docket No._
Cause No..

BEFORE THE BOARD OF OIL, GAS, AND
MINING DEPARTMENT OF NATURAL
RESOURCES
STATE OF UTAH

^
jg£
pD
Q
gj
p
Q
"***

John Doe,

Petitioner,

v.
Richard Doe,

Respondent.

Request for
Agency Action
Docket No
Cause No

220. Docket and Cause Number. Upon the filing of
a Request for Agency Action (petition), the secretary
of the Boardwill assign a docket and a cause number
to the matter. The secretary will enter the docket and
cause numbers for the matter, together with the date
of filing, on a separate docket provided for that purpose. Thereafter, all pleadings offered in the same
proceeding will bear the docket and cause numbers
assigned and will be noted with the filing date upon
the docket page assigned.
230. Content and Size of Pleadings. Pleadings
should be double-spaced and typed on plain, white,
8lh" x 11" paper. They must identify the proceeding
by title and by docket and cause number, if known.
All pleadings will contain a clear and concise statement of the matter relied upon as a basis for the
pleading, together with an appropriate prayer for relief when relief is sought.
240. Amendments to Pleadings. The Board may,
upon motion of the responsible party made at or before the hearing, allow any pleadings to be amended
or corrected. Defects which do not substantially prejudice any of the parties will be disregarded.
250. Signing of Pleadings. Pleadings will be signed
by the party or the party's attorney and will show the
signer's address and telephone number. The signature will be deemed to be a certification by the signer
that he or she has read the pleading and that, he or
she has taken reasonable measures to assure its

6$

briefs, or memoranda intended to be offered by pra
tioner in support of said petition or motion. Petition
will file with the petition a list of the names and lat
known addresses of all persons required by statufc u
be served or whose legally protected interest ma; at
affected thereby. This rule will apply to all mattn
initiated by the Board on its own motion as well un
statements, briefs, or memoranda in support theme"
prepared by the Division or by the Staff. Any petitiea
or other materials filed after the 10th day w'any ca^
endar month may be considered by the Board at n
regularly scheduled meeting during the followirjf
month only upon separate motion of petitioner road*
at or before the hearing for good cause shown.
R619-105-200. Responses.
210. All responses to petitions, responses to motions by petitioner, and motions by respondent, together with all affidavits, briefs, or memoranda ia
support thereof, filed by the 10th day of the month or
two weeks before the scheduled hearing, whichever u
earlier, in the month in which the hearing on ti*
matter is scheduled (the "Response Date") may bt
considered by the Board at its regularly scheduled
meeting during that month. This rule will apply to all
statements, briefs, or memoranda prepared by the Di
vision or by the Staff in response to any petition or
motion by petitioner. Any responses or other materials filed after the Response Date may be considered
at the Board's regularly scheduled meeting for that
month only upon separate motion of respondent made
at or before the hearing for good cause shown.
R619-105-300. Motions.
All motions or responses to motions available to a
petitioner or respondent at the time his or her Request for Agency Action or response is filed will be
filed and served with the petition or response as provided in R619-105-100 and R619-105-200. Subsequent written motions, other than motions for exceptions to the filing requirements of these rules, must
be filed by the time the response is due under
R619-105-200. Oral responses and written responses
to motions may be presented or filed at or before the
hearing. Oral motions and responses to oral motions
may be presented at the hearing.

R619-105-500. Exhibits.
Any exhibits intended to be offered by petitioners,
respondents, and intervenors in support of matters
198S
40-6-1 etaeq.
set forth in their respective pleadings will be filed
with the secretary of the Board on or before the time
the response is due under R619-105-200. Any exhibit*
R619-105. Filing and Service.
filed by any party after the Response Date, but prior
to the close of business two days before the hearing,
R619-105-100. Requests for Agency Action (Petimay be considered by the Board at the hearing, but in
tions).
such event the Staff will have the right to request a
R619-105-200. Responses.
continuance of the proceedings until the next reguR619-105-300. Motions.
larly scheduled meeting of the Board or hearing date
R619-105-500. Exhibits.
of the hearings examiner. (Any exhibits filed by any
R619-105-600. Place of Filing.
party after the close of business two days prior to the
R619-105-700. Temporary Procedural Rulings.
hearing, but before the hearing, may be considered by
R619-105-800. Computation of Time.
the Board at the hearing only upon separate motion
of the party offering the exhibit made at the hearing
R619-105-100. R e q u e s t s for A g e n c y Action (Petifor good cause shown. Any exhibits intended to be
tions).
offered by the parties in rebuttal of evidence preAll Requests for Agency Action filed by the 10th sented at the hearing will be presented at the hearday of each calendar month may be considered by the
ing. |rhe Board, on its own motion, may order the
Board for inclusion in the schedule of matters to be
continuance of any proceeding until the next reguheard at its regularly scheduled meeting during the
larly scheduled meeting of the Board in order to allow
following calendar month. At the time the request is
adequate time for the Staff to evaluate any evidence
filed, petitioner will also file any motions, affidavits,
presented during the hearing.

truth.
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R619-106-200. Personal Service of Request (Petition) and Related Pleadings.
210. In addition to the notice required by
R619-106-100, wherever personal service is required
by applicable law, the petitioner, or the Board in any
proceeding initiated by the Board, will personally
serve a copy of the petition and all pleadings filed
R619-105-700. Temporary Procedural Rulings.
with the secretary of the Board at the same time as
The Chairman or designated Acting Chairman of the petition, other than exhibits, on any person reihe Board may issue temporary rulings on procedural
quired by statute to be served and on any respondent.
motions that arise between Board hearings dates. The Board, on its own motion, may at any time also
These rulings will be reviewed and decided upon by
require petitioner to effect personal Bervice on any
the Board at its next regularly scheduled meeting.
other person whose legally protected interests may,
in the opinion of the Board, be affected by the proR619-105-800. Computation of Time.
ceedings. In Buch event the Board will prescribe the
In computing any period of time prescribed or alschedule for service of the request and any response
lowed by these rules, or by the Board, the day of the
thereto.
act, event, or default from which the designated pe220. Personal service under this rule will be acriod of time begins to run will not be included. The complished no later than the 15th day of the month
last day of the period so computed will be included,
preceding the month in which the first hearing in the
unless it is a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal holiday, matter is held.
in which event the period runs until the end of the
230. Personal service may be made by any person
next day which is not a Saturday, a Sunday, or a legal
authorized by law to serve summons in the same
holiday. When the period of time prescribed or al- manner and extent as is provided by the Utah Rules
lowed is less than seven days, intervening Saturdays, of Civil Procedure for the service of summons in civil
Sundays, or legal holidays will be excluded in the actions in the district courts in this state. Proof of
service wrfl be in the form required by law with recomputation.
spect to service of process in civil actions. Persons
ISM
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otherwise entitled to personal service under these
rules may be served by publication or mail in accorR619-106. Notice and Service.
dance with Rule 4(0 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. In such a case, any member of the Board may
R619-106-100. Notice.
consider ex parte and rule upon the verified motion of
R619-106-200. Personal Service of Request (Petition) any person seeking to accomplish service by publication or mail.
and Related Pleadings.
R619-106-300. Service of Other Pleadings.
R619-106-300. Service of Other Pleadings.
R619-106-400. Service on Attorney or RepresentaA copy of all pleadings filed subsequent to the Retive.
quest for Agency Action or Notice of Agency Action,
R619-106-500. Proof of Service.
which are not required to be personally served pursuR619-106-600. Additional Notices Upon Request.
ant to R619-106-200, will be served by mailing a copy
R619-106-700. Continuance of Hearing Without New
thereof, postage prepaid, to all parties at the same
Service.
time such pleadings are filed with the secretary of the
Board. Exhibits need not be served on all parties, but
may be examined by any party during the normal
R619-106-100. Notice.
Except as otherwise provided by law, before any business hours of the Division by arrangement with
the secretary of the Board.
rule, regulation, or order, or amendment thereof, will
M19-105-600. P l a c e of Filing.
An original and 12 copies of all pleadings, affidavit*, briefs, memoranda and exhibits will be filed
•ith the secretary of the Board. The Board may direct
any party to provide additional copies as needed.

be made by the Board, notice of a hearing thereon
will be given by publication in a newspaper of general
circulation in the city of Salt Lake and county of Salt
Lake, Utah, and in any newspapers of general circulation published in the county where the land affected or some part thereof is situated. Such notice
will be issued in the name of the state and will be
signed by the Board or its secretary. The notice will
specify the title and docket and cause numbers of the
proceeding, the time and place of hearing and
whether the case is set for hearing before the Board
or its designated hearing examiner. The notice will
briefly state the purpose of the proceeding and general nature of the order, rule, or regulation to be promulgated or effected. The notice will also state the
name(8) of the petitioner and respondent, if any, and,
unless the order, rule, or regulation is intended to
apply to and affect the entire state, the notice will
specify the land or resource affected by such order,
rule, or regulation. In addition to published notice,
the Board will give notice by mail to all parties. Such
notice will be given by the 1st day of the month in
which the hearing is held, but in no event less than
fifteen days before the hearing.

R619-106-400. Service o n Attorney or Representative.
When any party has appeared by attorney or other
authorized representative, service upon such attorney
or representative constitutes service upon the party
he or she represents.
R619-106-500. Proof of Service.
There will appear on all documents required to be
served a certificate of service in substantially the following form:
I hereby certify that I have this day served the
foregoing instrument upon all parties of record in this
proceeding (by delivering a copy thereof in person to
) (by mailing a copy thereof, properly addressed, with postage prepaid, to
).
Dated at
, this day of
, 19,
Signature
or
1 hereby certify that I have this day served the
foregoing document by publication of a notice thereof
in the (name of newspaper), a newspaper of general
circulation in Salt Lake City and County and in

R619-106-600
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(name of newspaper(s)), (a) newspaper(s) of general
circulation in the County of
Copies of the
notices are attached to this certification.
Dated at
, this day of
, 19
Signature
R619-106-600. Additional Notices Upon Request.
Any person desiring notification by mail from the
Board or the Division of all matters before the Board
will request the same in writing by filing with the
Board or Division his or her name and address and
designating the area or areas in which he or she has
an interest and in which he or she desires to receive
such notice. The Division may designate an annual
fee, payable in advance, for such notice.
R619-106-700. Continuance of Hearing Without
N e w Service.
Any hearing before the Board held after due notice
may be continued by the person presiding at such
hearing to a specified time and place without the necessity of notice of the same being again served or
published. In the event of any continuance, a statement thereof will be made in the record of the hearing which is continued. If a hearing (not the deliberation or decision) is continued indefinitely, the Board
will provide new notice in accordance with these
rules before hearing the matter.

R619-107. Prehearing Conference.
R619-107-100. Conference.
R619-107-200. Order.
R619-107-100. Conference.
The Board, may in its discretion, on its own motion
or motion of one of the parties made on or before the
date the response is due, direct the parties or their
representatives to appear at a specified time and
place for a prehearing conference. At the conference,
consideration will be given to:
110. Simplification or formulation of the issues;
120. The possibility of obtaining stipulations, admissions of facts, and agreements to the introduction
of documents;
130. Limitation of the number of expert witnesses;
140. Arranging for the exchange of proposed exhibits or prepared expert testimony; and
150. Any other matters which may expedite the
proceeding.
R619-107-200. Order.
The Board will issue an order based upon its own
findings or upon the recommendation of its designated hearing examiner, which recites the action
taken at the conference and the agreements made as
to any of the matters considered, and which limits the
issues for hearing to those not disposed of by admissions or agreements. Such order will control the subsequent course of the proceeding before the Board unless modified by subsequent order for good cause
shown.
1988
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R619-108. Conduct of Hearings.
R619-108-1. Conduct of Hearings.
R619-108-100. Public Hearings.
R619-108-200. Rules of Evidence.
R619-108-300. Testimony.
R619-108-400. Failure to Appear.

R619-108-500.
R619-108-600.
R619-108-700.
R619-108-800.
R619-108-900.

700
Order of Presentation of Evidence.
Oral Argument and Briefs.
Record of Hearing.
Summons and FeeB.
Discovery.

R619-108-1. Conduct of Hearings.
Except us may otherwise be provided by law, hearings before the Board will be conducted as follow*
R619-108-100. Public Hearings.
All hearings before the Board will be open to the
public, unless otherwise ordered by the Board for
good cause shown. All hearings shr.ll be open to all
parties.
101. Full Disclosure. The Board shall regulate the
course of the hearing to obtain full disclosure of relevant facts and to afford all the parties reasonable
opportunity to present their positions.
R619-108-200. Rules of Evidence.

Thn Rnnrr4 ? k " n
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Rules of Evidence insofar as the same may be applicable and not inconsistent with theae riilon, Notwith.
standing this, on its own motion or upon objections of
a party, the Board:
201. May exclude evidence that is irrelevant, immaterial, or unduly repetitious.
'20± Shall exclude evidence "privileged in the
courts of Utah.
203. May receive documentary evidence in the
form of a copy of excerpt if the copy or excerpt contains all pertinent portions of the original document
204. May take official notice of any facts that could
be judicially noticed under the Utah Rules of Evidence, of the record or other proceedings before the
Board, and of technical or scientific facts within the
Board's specialized knowledge.
R619-108-300. Testimony.
Testimony presented to the Board in a hearing will
be sworn testimony under oath or affirmation.
R619-108-400. Failure to Appear.
When a party to a proceeding fails to appear at a
hearing after due notice has been given, the Board
may dismiss or continue the matter or decide the
matter against the interest of the party who fails to
appear.
R619-108-500. Order of Presentation of Evi
dence.
Unless otherwise directed by the Board at the hearing, the order of procedure and presentation of evidence will be as follows:
510. Hearings upon Petition:
511. Petitioner
512. Respondent, if any
513. Staff
514. Intervenors
515. Rebuttal by Petitioner
520. Hearings upon motion of the Board:
521. StafT
522. Respondent
523. Rebuttal by Staff
11619-108-600. Oral Argument and Briefs.
Upon the conclusion of the taking of evidence, the
Board may, in its discretion, permit the parties to
make oral arguments or submit additional briefs or
memoranda upon a schedule to be designated by the
Board.
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R619-108-700. Record of Hearing.
The Board will cause an official record of the proceedings to be made in all hearings as follows:
710. The record may be made by means of a certified shorthand reporter employed by the Board or by
a party desiring to employ a certified shorthand reporter at its own cost in the event that the Board
chooses not to employ the reporter. If a party employs
a certified shorthand reporter, the original transcript
of the hearing will be filed with the Board. Parties
desiring a copy of the certified shorthand reporter's
transcript may purchase it from the reporter.
720. The record of the proceedings may also be
made by means of a tape recorder or other recording
device if the Board determines that it is unnecessary
or impracticable to employ a certified shorthand reporter and the parties do not desire to employ a certified shorthand reporter.
730. If the Board deems it unnecessary, it will not
have the record of a hearing transcribed unless requested to do so by a party. Whenever a transcript or
tape recording of a hearing is made, it will be available at the office of the Board for the use of the parties, but may not be withdrawn therefrom.
R619-108-800. S u m m o n s and Fees.
810. Summons. The Board may issue summons on
its own motion or upon request of a party for the
attendance of witnesses and the production of any
pertinent paper, book, record, document, or other evidence.
820. Witness Fees. Each witness who appears before the Board will be entitled to receive the same
fees and mileage allowed by law to witnesses in a
district court, which amount will be paid by the party
at whose request the witness is subpoenaed. Witnesses appearing at the request of the Board will be
paid from the funds appropriated for the use of the
Board. Any witness summoned by a party other than
the Board may, at the time of service of the summons,
demand one day's witness fee and mileage in advance
and unless such fee is tendered, the witness will not
be required to appear.
R619-108-900. Discovery.
Upon the motion of a party and for good cause
shown, the Board may authorize such manner of discovery against another party, including the Division
or the Staff, as may be prescribed by and in the manner provided by the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
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R619-109. Decisions and Orders.
R619-109-100.
R619-109-200.
R619-109-300.
R619-109-400.

Board Decision.
Entry of Order.
Notice.
Emergency Orders.

RG19-109-100. Board Decision.
Upon reaching a final decision in any proceeding,
the Board will prepare a decision to include findings
of fact, conclusions of law, and an order. The Board
may direct the prevailing party to prepare proposed
findings of fact, conclusions of law, and an order,
which will be completed within five days of the direction, unless otherwise instructed by the Board. Copies
of the proposed findings of fact, conclusions of law,
and order will be served by the prevailing party upon
all parties of record before being presented to the
Board for signature. Notice of objection thereto will

R619-110-300

be submitted to the Board and all parties of record
within five days after service.
R619-109-200. Entry of Order.
The Chairman or designated Acting Chairman of
the Board will sign the order on any matter no later
than 30 days following the end of the hearing on that
matter, and cause the same to be entered and indexed
in books kept for that purpose. The order will be effective on the date it is signed, unless otherwise provided in the order. Upon petition of a person subject
to the order and for good cause shown, the Board may
extend the time for compliance fixed in its order.
R619-109-300. Notice.
The Board will notify all parties to the proceeding
of its decision. A copy of the order with accompanying
findings of fact and conclusions of law will be delivered or mailed to each party.
R619-109-400. Emergency Orders.
Notwithstanding the other provisions of these regulations, the Director of the Division or any member
of the Board is authorized to issue an emergency order without notice or hearing, in accordance with the
npplicnbj.(^statute. The emergency order will remain
in effect no longer than until the next regular meeting of the Board, or such shorter period of time as will
be prescribed by statute.
1988
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R619-110. Rehearing and Modification
of Existing Orders.
R619-110-100.
R619-110-200.
R619-110-300.
R619-110-400.
R619-110-500.

Time for filing.
Contents of Petition.
Response to Petition.
Action on the Petition.
Modification of Existing Orders.

R619-110-100. Time for filing.
Any person affected by a final order or decision of
the Board may file a petition for rehearing. Unless
otherwise provided, a petition for rehearing must be
filed no later than the 10th day of the month following the date of signing of the final order or decision
for which the rehearing is sought. A copy of such
petition will be served on each other party to the proceeding no later than the 15th day of that month.
R619-110-200. Contents of Petition.
A petition for rehearing will set forth specifically
the particulars in which it is claimed the Board's order or decision is unlawful, unreasonable, or unfair. If
the petition is based upon a claim that the Board
failed to consider certain evidence, it will include an
abstract of that evidence. If the petition is based upon
newly discovered evidence, then the petition will be
accompanied by an affidavit setting forth the nature
and extent of such evidence, its relevancy to the issues involved, and a statement that the party could
not, with reasonable diligence, have discovered the
evidence prior to the hearing.
R619-110-300. R e s p o n s e to Petition.
All other parties to the proceeding upon which a
rehearing is sought may file a response to the petition
at any time prior to the hearing at which the petition
will be considered by the Board. Such responses will
be served on the petitioner at or before the hearing.

criminal cases. Presumptions in criminal cases
are not treated in this rule. See Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-603 (1953) or any subsequent revision of that section. Recent decisions
of the United States Supreme Court in
Mullaney v. Wilbur, 421 U S. 684 (1975) and
Patterson v. New York, 432 U.S. 197 (19771
have given a constitutional dimension to presumptions in criminal cases.
Subdivision (b) is comparable in substance to
Rule 15, Utah Rules of Evidence (1971). Utah
law is believed to generally follow the position
taken by the Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974)
and the provisions of Article 111 as originally
promulgated by the United States Supreme
Court. See Presumptions in Utah: A Search for
Certainty. 6 Utah L. Rev. 196 (1956).
Cross-References. — Criminal proceed^
ings, presumption of fact in, S 76-1-503.

presumption continue to exist and the burden
of establishing the non-existence of the presumed fact is upon the party against whom the
presumption operates . . . ." To the same effect, see Koesling v. Basamakis, 639 P2d 1043
(Utah 1975). If evidence to rebut a presumption has not been admitted, the presumption
will determine outcome on the issue; if such
evidence has been admitted, the presumption
will dictate the instruction to be given the jury
on how they are to resolve doubt. There will
continue to be fact combinations which satisfy
the burden of going forward with the evidence
but which are not "presumptions" within the
meaning of this rule and which therefore do
not shift the burden of persuasion. They might
best be called "permissible inferences."
The Utah Rules of Evidence (1971) did not
prohibit the application of presumptions in

NOTES TO DECISIONS
proof without aid of presumption. Koesling v.
Basamakis, 539 P.2d 1043 (Utah 1975).
Presumption upheld.
Where mother executed will and trust instrument, and it was later found that the will
had been executed as a result of undue influence, there was a prima facie presumption of
continued undue influence with respect to an
alleged subsequent ratification of the trust.
Robertson v. Campbell, 674 P.2d 1226 (Utah
19831.

ANALYSIS

Presumption not raised.
Presumption upheld.

Presumption not raised.
Payment of portion of profits to defendant as
partial reimbursement for expenditures of defendant in connection with business premises
did not raise presumption of a partnership, and
S3 plaintiff was required to meet his burden of
W
COLLATERAL REFERENCES

3

Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63. 75.
Am. Jur. 2d. — 29 Am. Jur. 2d Evidence
§§ 159 to 165, 167.
C.J.S. — 31A C.J.S. Evidence 5 119.
A.L.R. — Effect of presumption as evidence
.ox^HpoDL-huxdeQ of proof, where controverting
evidence is introduced,"'!*' A.L.R.3d 19.
Refusal of defendant in "public figure" libel
cas«< to identify claimed sources as raising presumption against existence of source, 19
A.L.R4th 919.
Presumptions and evidence respecting iden-

tification of land on which property taxes were
paid to establish adverse possession, 36
A.L.R.4th 843.
Applicability of res ipsa loquitur in case of
multiple, nonmedical defendants—modern statua, 59 A.L.R.4th 201.
Medical malpractice: presumption or infer,
ence from failure of hospital or doctor to produce relevant medical records, 69 A.L.R.4th
906.
Key Numbers. — Criminal I*aw *» 305,
325; Evidence «=» 85 et seq.

Rule 302. Applicability of federal law in civil actions and
proceedings.
In civil actions and proceedings, the effect of a presumption respecting a fact
which is an element of a claim or defense as to which federal law supplies the
rule of decision is determined in accordance with federal law.
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Rule 302

Advisory Committee Note. — The text of
this rule is taken from Rule 302, Uniform
Rules of Evidence (1974). Presumptions in

criminal cases are not treated in this rule. See
Utah Code Annotated, Section 76-1-503 (1953)
or any subsequent revision of that section.

ARTICLE IV.
RELEVANCY AND ITS LIMITS.
Rule 401. Definition of "relevant evidence."
"Relevant evidence" means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact that is of consequence to the determine*-'"" nf'fche action n^ore
probable or less probable M^p ft wnnlrl fr° m»f|^M1t \u^ ^{[f\pPrei
Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is comparable
in substance to Rule 1(2), Utah Rules of Evidence (1971), but the former rule defined relevant evidence as that having a tendency to

prove or disprove the existence of any "material fact." Avoiding the use of the term "material fact" accords with the application given to
former Rule 1(2) by the Utah Supreme Court,
State v. Peterson, 660 P.2d 1387 (Utah 1977).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS
Effect of remoteness.
Cited.
„
A ,
A
Effect of remoteness.
Remoteness usually gues to the.weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v.
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds,
McFarland v. Sknggs Companies, Inc., 678
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).

Cited in State v. Gray, 7J7 P2d 1313 tUtah
1986); State v. Nickles, 728 P.2d 123 (Utah
1986); Meyers v. Salt Lake City Corp., 747
P.2d 1058 (Utah Ct. App. 1988); Fisher ex rel.
Fisher v. Trapp, 748 P.2d 204 (Utah Ct. App.
,
1 9 8 8 ) ; HeM<M| y 0 | | | |
7f>2 R 2 d
j31?
(Ulflh Ct A
w m . StnU> y Worthen% 7 6 6
p 2 d 8;J9 ( U u h
p 2d 981 ( U u h

iy88); S u t e
i m i y

stato

y

Muu|W|

|n re R D s

770
777

p 2 d 5 3 2 ( U t a h C t A p p 1 9 8 a , ; Whitehead v.
American Motors Sales Corp., 801 P.2d 920.
(Utah 1990).

COLLATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. — Utah Rules of Evidence 1983, 1985 Utah L. Rev. 63, 78.
United States v. Downing: Novel Scientific

Evidence and the Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah
L. Rev. 839.

Rule 402. Relevant evidence generally admissible; irrelevant evidence inadmissible.
All relevant evidence is admissible, except as otherwise provided by the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the state of Utah,
statute, or by these rules, or by other rules applicable in courts of this state.
Evidence which is not relevant is not admissible.
Advisory Committee Note. — The text of
this rule is Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (L974) except that prior to the word
"fltstute" the words "Constitution of the United
States" huve been added.

Compiler's Notes. — The Utah rule also
adds the words "or the Constitution of the state
of Utah" to Rule 402, Uniform Rules of Evidence (1974).
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NOTES TO DECISIONS
evidence when the evidence invites the jury to
focus upon a seemingly scientific, numerical
conclusion rather than to analyze the evidence
before it and decide where truth lies. State v.
Rammel, 721 P.2d 498 (Utah 1986).

ANALYSIS

Discretion of court.
Effect of remoteness.
Irrelevant evidence.
Probability evidence.
Scientific evidence.
Standard of review.

Scientific evidence.
The JFVve test (that scientific tests still in the
experimental stages should not be admitted in
evidence, but that scientific testimony deduced
from a well recognized scientific principle or
discovery is admissible if the scientific principle is sufficiently established) is a valid test,
though not necessarily an exclusive test, for
determining when scientific evidence is sufficiently reliable to be admitted and is not inconsistent with Rules 402, 403, and 702 of the
Utah Rules of Evidence. Kofford v. Flora, 744
P.2d 1343 (Utah 1987).

_& Discretion of court.
*1 The trial court is given considerable discretion in deciding whether or not evidence submitted is relevant. Bambrough v. Bethers, 552
P.2d 1286 (Utub 197KT
Effoct of remoteness.
Remoteness usually goes to the weight of the
evidence and not its admissibility. Terry v.
Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314
(Utah 1979), overruled on other grounds,
McFarland v. Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678
P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).

S t a n d a r d of review.
The judgment of the trial court admitting or
excluding evidence will not be reversed unless
it is shown that the discretion exercised
therein has been abused. Terry v. Zions Coop.
Mercantile InBt._605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979).
overruled on other grounds, McFarland v,
Skaggs Companies, Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah
1984).

Irrelevant evidence.
Testimony as to impulsiveness of another
participant in the crime had no bearing on defendant's guilt or innocence and was properly
excluded 8S not relevant to defendant's participation in the crime State v. Stephens, 667
P.2d 686 (Utah 1983).
Probability evidence.
Courts have routinely excluded probability

COLI.ATERAL REFERENCES
Utah Law Review. —- United States v.
Downing: Novel Scientific Evidence and the
Rejection of Frye, 1986 Utah L. Rev. 839.
Note, Establishing Paternity Through HLA
Testing' Utah Standards for Admissibility,
1988 Utah L Rev. 717.
A.L.R. — Admissibility of voice stress evaluation test results or of statements made during
test, 47 A.L.R.4th 1202.
AdmTssnSiTiEy and weight of evidence of prior
mistdentification of accused in connection with
commission of crime similar to that presently
charged, 50 A.L.R.4th 1049.
Products liability: admissibility of evidence
of absence of other accidents, 51 A.L.R.4th
1186.

Thermographic tests* admissibility of test result* in personal injury suits, 56 A.L.R.4th
1105.
Criminal law: dog scent discrimination
lineups, 63 A L.R.4th 143.
Products liability: admissibility of experimental or test evidence to disprove defect in
motor vehicle, 64 A.L R 4th 125.
Admissibility, in criminal cases, of evidence
of electrophoresis of dried evidentiary bloodstains, 66 A.L.R.4th 588.
Admissibility, in prosecution for sex-related
offense, of results of tests on semen or seminal
fluids. 75 A.L.R.4th 897.
Admissibility of hypnotically refreshed or
enhanced testimony, 77 A.L.R.4th 927.

Rule 403. Exclusion of relevant evidence on grounds of
prejudice, confusion, or waste of time.
Although relevant, evidence may be excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waate of
time, or needless presentation of cumulative evidence.
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Advisory Committee Note. — This rule is
the federal rule, verbatim, and is substantively
comparable to Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence
(197U except thnt "surprise" is not included as
a basis for exclusion of relevant evidence. The
change in language ja not one of substance,
since "surprise" would be within the concept, of
"unfair prejudice" as contained in Rule 402
(Rule 4031 See also Advisory Committee Note
to Federal Rule 403 indicat;*ig that a continuance in most instances would be a more appropriate method of dealing with "surprise "
See also Smith v. Esteile. 445 F. Supp. 047
(N.D. Tex. 1977) (surprise use of psychiatric

Rule 403

testimony in capital case ruled prejudicial and
violation of due process) See the following
Utah coses to the same effect. Terry v. Zions
Coop Mercantile Inst., 605 P.2d 314 (Utah
19791; State v. Johns, 615 I\2d 1260 (Utah
1980); Reiser v. Lohner, 641 P.2d 93 (Utah
1982).
Compiler's Notes. — The bracketed reference to "Rule 403" in the Advisory Committee
Note to Rule 403 was inserted because Rule
402 does not refer to "unfair prejudice" and
Rule 403 appears to be the correct reference.
Crosa-Referencea. — Admissibility of evidence, Rules of Civil Procedure, Rule 43(a).

NOTES TO DECISIONS
ANALYSIS

605 P.2d 314 (Utah 1979), overruled on other
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Companies,
Inc., 678 P.2d 298 (Utah 1984).

Balancing test.
Bias.
Circumstantial evidence.
Credibility of witness.
Cumulative evidence.
Determination of admissibility.
Expert testimony.
Film of murder scene.
Guilty plea.
Impeachment of witness.
Inflammatory evidence.
Other offenses.
Photographic evidence.
Prior convictions.
—Impeachment.
Scientific evidence.
Standard of review.
Tape recordings.
•—Defendant's admissions.
—Videotapes in pornography trial.
Unfairly prejudicial.
Victim's testimony.
Cited.

Credibility of witness.
This rule is not to be used to allow the trial
judge to substitute his as^esament ot the credibility of testimony for that of the jury by excluding testimony aimply because he does not
find it credible. Stale v. Branch, 743 P.2d 1187
(Utah 1987), cert, denied. 485 U.S 1036, 108 S.
Ct. 1597, 99 L. Ed. 2d 911 (1988).
Cumulative evidence.
While there may have been little reason to
admit into evidence transcripts of recorded
conversations between the defendant and a
government informant because the evidence
was cumulative, their admission was not prejudicial because the transcripts merely repeated
the informant's in-court testimony. State v.
Knowles, 709 P.2d 311 (Utah 1985).

Balancing test.
The balancing test of this rule excludes matter of scant or cumulative probative force,
dragged in by the heels for the sake of its prejudicial effect Slate v. Bartlcy, 784 P.2d 1231
(Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Bias.
The right to cross-examine regarding bins is
limited by this rule. State v. Hack ford. 737
P.2d 20()'(Ulah 1987).
Circumstantial evidence.
Circumstantial evidence, although relevant,
may nevertheless be excluded if the usefulness
of the evidence is more than counterbalanced
by its disadvantageous effects in confusing the
issues hefoie the jury, or in creating an undue
prejudice in excess of its legitimate probative
weight. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst.,

Determination of admissibility.
Although the relevancy of proffered evidence
is crucial, the probative value of the evidence,
standing alone, does not determine its admissibility. Terry v. Zions Coop. Mercantile Inst.,
605 P2d 314 (Utah 19/9), overruled on other
grounds, McFarland v. Skaggs Companies,
Inc., 678 P2d 298 (Utah J984).
At defendant's trial for forging an endorsement on a check, where actual forgery had
been committed by companion, blank checks
found in defendant's car were admissible as evidence to support an inference of defendant's
knowledge of the fraud and intentional participation in the forgery; the probative value of
the blank checks was not substantially outweighed by their potential prejudicial effect.
State v. McCardell, 652 P.2d 942 (Utah 1982).
In a drug product liability action, there was
no error in admitting inserts contained in drug
packages, containing warnings of possible si^e
etlects, where the jury verdict finding negligence was general, where the inserts had a
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